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LIBERALISM AND TORT LAW: ON THE CONTENT AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF A LIBERAL
COMMON LAW OF TORTS
© 2005 Richard S. Markovits

ABSTRACT
This Article has three parts. Part I begins by delineating the protocol one should use to determine
whether a society is an immoral society, an amoral society, a goal-based society of moral
integrity, or a rights-based society of moral integrity (i.e., a society that engages in a bifurcated
prescriptive-moral practice that strongly distinguishes moral-rights claims [about the just] from
moral-ought claims [about the good], that is committed to the lexical priority of the just over the
good, and that fulfills its commitments to some hard-to-specify, requisite extent). Part I then
proceeds to outline the protocol one should use to determine the moral norm that any particular
rights-based society is committed to using to derive moral-rights conclusions. It next provides an
account of the liberal moral norm that I think our rights-based society is committed to
instantiating. It argues that this norm commits us to treating all creatures that have the
neurological prerequisites to lead a life of moral integrity (to take their moral obligations
seriously and to take seriously as well the dialectical task of choosing a conception of the good
and leading a life that is consonant with that conception) with appropriate, equal respect and to
showing appropriate, equal concern for such creatures, in part for their welfare as economists
understand that concept but primarily for their having a meaningful opportunity to lead a life of
moral integrity. Part I concludes by examining the implications of our society's liberal
commitments for (1) the tort-related moral duties and rights of its members and participants and
(2) the general tort-related duties of its governments and the more specific duties of our society's
courts when adjudicating common-law tort cases. This account proceeds from a premise
uncongenial to economics that, from the perspective of liberalism, not all effects are
commensurable - viz., that any tendency of a choice to deprive moral-rights holders on balance
of a meaningful opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity by killing them, depriving them of
the neurological prerequisites for leading a life of moral integrity, subjecting them to lifedominating pain, or (perhaps) treating them in ways that substantially undercut their perception
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that they are the authors of their own lives cannot be offset by any tendency the choice has to
increase "mere utility" or "welfare" as economists understand that term. Part I argues inter alia
that (1) its claim that ours is a liberal, rights-based society and (2) its account of the implications
of that fact for the obligations of our society's members, participants, and common-law judges
provide a normative grounding both for something like the Hand formula for negligence and for
the common law's treatment of ultrahazardous activities. More specifically, Part 1 argues that
liberalism implies that (1) something like the Hand formula for negligence is the appropriate
standard for determining tort liability for possibly-tortious choices made by individuals who
knew or should have known that their choices should be expected to impose net equivalent-dollar
losses on others that reflect “mere-utility losses” the relevant victims sustained and (2)
individuals who made possibly-tortious choices they knew or should have known should be
expected to disserve the interests of some others in having a meaningful opportunity to lead a life
of moral integrity are liable in tort unless their choices served the on-balance interests of the
society’s members and participants in having an opportunity to lead such a life.

Part 2 then examines whether a common law of torts that seeks solely to secure liberal
corrective-justice rights will be economically efficient. More specifically, Part 2 delineates and
explores twelve reasons why the correct resolution of a liberal corrective-justice claim may not
be economically efficient.

Finally, Part 3 identifies and analyzes the moral status (inter alia, the moral legitimacy) and
likely generic desirability (moral-rights considerations aside) of the various possible noncommon-law components of the positive tort law of a liberal, rights-based State—i.e., of its
relevant constitutional law, statutory law, administrative regulations, and truly-judge-made law.
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LIBERALISM AND TORT LAW: ON THE CONTENT AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF A LIBERAL
COMMON LAW OF TORTS
© 2005 Richard S. Markovits

This Article analyzes
(1)

the proper way to determine the general moral character, the general moral type,
and the specific moral commitments of any society;

(2)

the general content of liberal moral commitments;

(3)

the tort-law-related corollaries of a liberal, rights-based society’s commitments—
i.e., the implications of liberalism for the moral and legal tort-related rights and/or
obligations of a liberal, rights-based society’s members, participants, and
governments,

(4)

the reasons why judges in those liberal, rights-based societies that have a common
law of torts are obligated to resolve common-law tort cases in favor of a plaintiff
if and only if he has a corrective-justice1-based right of redress against the
defendant (who had harmed him wrongfully by making a tortious choice that
violated the defendant’s liberal moral obligations to the plaintiff);

(5)

the economic efficiency of the common law of torts of a liberal, rights-based
society; and

(6)

the moral status from a liberal perspective and the generic desirability (moralrights considerations aside) of the various possible non-common-law components
of the tort law of a liberal, rights-based society.

The Article has three parts. Part 1 focuses on the first four issues in the preceding list.
Part 2 delineates and explains twelve reasons why a body of tort law that is exclusively oriented
toward securing wronged tort victims’ corrective-justice tort rights may not be economically
efficient. And Part 3 analyzes the relationship between the possible constitutional, statutory,
1

In standard usage, “corrective justice” requires that “individuals who are responsible for the wrongful
losses of others have a duty to repair the losses.” See Jules Coleman, Tort Law and Tort Theory: Preliminary
Reflections on Method in Philosophy and the Law of Torts (Gerald Postema, ed.) 183, 184 (2001). In this study, I
will use the expression “corrective-justice-related” duties to refer not only to this duty of repair but also to the duty
of members of a rights-based State not to commit the wrongs that can give rise to a corrective-justice duty of repair
and to the duties of the government(s) of a rights-based State to prevent such wrongs, to secure compensation for
victims of such wrongs, and perhaps to prevent those who have committed such wrongs from profiting from them.
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administrative-regulation, and judicially-legislated components of the positive tort law of a
liberal, rights-based society and that society’s moral commitments and offers some brief
comments on the relative generic attractiveness (rights-consideration aside) of the noncorrective-justice-oriented legislation that legislatures, administrative agencies, and judges are
likely to create.
Before proceeding, I want to make four preliminary observations.

First, many

philosophically-oriented analyses of tort law focus on formal elements of corrective justice
without ever discussing the grounding or content of the substantive moral right whose violation
gives rise to a concrete corrective-justice claim. This Article focuses primarily on the grounding
and content of the moral rights whose existence corrective-justice claims presuppose.
Second, although the moral and possible legal tort-related corollaries of liberalism will
clearly be of more interest if, as I claim, ours is a liberal, rights-based society, one might be
interested in liberalism’s tort-related implications even if no actual society were a liberal, rightsbased society. Readers who reject my conclusions about our society’s general moral type,
general moral character, and specific moral commitments and/or my claims about those
conclusions’ implications for the internally-right answer to some legal-rights questions may
therefore still be interested in the Article’s analyses of (1) the implications of liberalism for the
way in which private actors should behave in situations in which their choices might be tortious,
(2) the implications of liberalism for the choices that common-law judges and other officials of a
liberal, rights-based State are obligated to make, and (3) the reasons why the tort-related private
and State choices that liberalism recommends may not be allocatively efficient.
Third, some readers may understandably be troubled by my handling of the various fits
and non-fits between (1) my accounts of (A) liberalism and (B) its tort-related corollaries on the
one hand and (2)(A) the positive common law of torts in the United States2 and (B) various
normative positions at least some Americans take on related issues on the other hand. Such
readers may complain that I am trying to have it both ways. Thus, in the one direction, I proudly
announce the fact that my account of liberalism fits various legal doctrines and social beliefs.
For example, I trumpet the fact that my account of liberalism’s implications for the moral
obligations of potential injurers in a liberal, rights-based society who are considering choices that
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may harm others in ways that do not deprive them of a meaningful opportunity to lead a life of
moral integrity (that may impose what I will call “mere utility” losses on them) not only fits (at
least a cleaned-up version of) the Hand formula for negligence but provides a moral grounding
for that legal doctrine. Similarly, I take some pride in the fact that my account of liberalism’s
implications for the moral obligations of potential injurers who are considering choices that may
harm others in ways that would deprive them of a meaningful opportunity to lead a life of moral
integrity would provide a normative justification for the RESTATEMENT (SECOND’S) conclusion
about the liability of owners of “ultrahazardous activities.” At least, my account of liberalism
will ground this RESTATEMENT conclusion if the key expressions in the relevant RESTATEMENT
provisions (“abnormally dangerous” and “low value” to the community) were given plausible
though non-standard interpretations—i.e., if the RESTATEMENT provision is read to state that
injurers whose (ultrahazardous) activities are “abnormally dangerous” in the sense of creating a
risk that they may deprive someone of the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity are liable
for the losses such activities cause even if their avoidance-move rejections would not be deemed
negligent by the conventional Hand formula unless their choices did not on balance disserve the
interest of the relevant population in having such an opportunity (were otherwise of sufficiently
“high value” to the community in the sense of promoting such opportunities in other ways to
make them morally desirable when evaluated through the application of such an opportunity-tolead-a-life-of-moral-integrity metric). And again, I take some comfort in the fact that the selfconception-oriented corollary of liberalism I articulate (which focuses on the importance of
individuals’ feeling that they are the authors of their own lives) provides a liberal justification for
at least some libertarian conclusions about the liberty rights of moral-rights holders.
In the other direction, some readers may feel that I am insufficiently intellectually
disturbed by various non-fits between my account of the legal implications of liberalism and our
positive law of torts or the more general way in which the governments of our society have
responded to tort contingencies. If anything, such readers might claim, I treat these non-fits not
as evidence against my conclusions about our society’s moral commitments and/or their
common-law-of-torts corollaries but as evidence of these conclusions’ practical importance—
i.e., argue that the existence of such non-fits enhances the value of my analysis by creating the
2

Yes, I know that the law of torts varies from state to state.

Articles/09_27_2004_Liberalism_and_Tort_Law

6

possibility that it might lead to improvements in our society’s conduct. Although there is
something to this accusation, it tells only part of the story. In fact, I do regret these non-fits (1)
not just because, as a liberal, I regret the reality they manifest (our society’s failure to instantiate
liberal norms) but also (2) because I recognize that their existence disfavors either or both my
conclusion that our society is a liberal, rights-based society and/or my conclusions about the
content of the common law of torts of a liberal, rights-based State and the more general tortrelated obligations of the governments of a liberal, rights-based State.
However, I admit that I find the relevant non-fits less damaging to my position than many
readers might, at least on first thought, consider them to be. In part, my assessment of the
significance of such non-fits reflects my conclusion that, to be justified, my conclusions about
the moral type, moral character, and specific moral commitments of our society need not fit the
conduct, beliefs, and perceptions of our society’s members and governments perfectly. They
need only (1) discounted-fit these facts better than do any alternative conclusions about our
society’s moral character and specific moral commitments (where the weight of a non-fit is
discounted by its explicability—see below) and (2) discounted-fit these facts well enough to
justify the conclusion that our society has moral integrity (is a society that has commitments that
deserve to be called “moral” and fulfills these commitments well enough to deserve to be called
“a society of moral integrity”—see below again). And, in part, my assessment of the damage
these non-fits do to my position reflects my conclusion that, although legal realities are relevant
to the “empirical” analyses of “discounted fit” on which conclusions about a society’s moral
type, moral character, and specific moral commitments must be based, such data form only a tiny
percentage of the social facts from which such conclusions should be derived. Most of the
relevant data relates to the prescriptive-moral claims, arguments, conclusions, perceptions, and
conduct that people make, reach, have, and engage in outside of legal fora, frequently when—for
transaction-cost-related or other reasons—there is no possibility that a legal claim will ever be
made. Legal academics are far too inclined to believe that only arguments and decisions that are
made in courts or legislatures are relevant to determining the internally-right answer to a legalrights issue. This Article both argues for and proceeds from a contrary conclusion.
The fourth and final observation I want to make at this juncture relates to the extent of the
changes that I think our liberal commitments require us to make in our tort-related conduct. In
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the one direction, I want to point out that—to my mind—our liberal commitments do obligate us
to change a good deal not only of our tort law but also of our tort-related conduct. Think, for
example, of the number of contemporary decisions that violate the corollary of liberalism (see
below) that choices that create the possibility that some member of or participant in our society
may lose the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity (by creating a risk that he may be killed,
deprived of the neurological prerequisites for acting as a moral agent, subjected to lifedominating pain, or perhaps induced to reject the belief that he is the author of [and hence is
responsible for] his own life) are moral-rights-violative unless the chooser can demonstrate that
ex ante he reasonably believed that his choice would not disserve on balance the interest of the
relevant creatures in having such an opportunity. More particularly, I want to point out the
“radical” implications of liberalism to counter the frequently-made claim that moral arguments
that focus on the existing commitments of the society or individuals to which they apply are
conservative in that they support the status quo in the special sense of demanding no change in
conduct: although that argument would be correct if all individuals and societies lived up to their
moral commitments perfectly or (somewhat relatedly) if moral commitments had to be inferred
from conduct and were isolated in the sense of not being interconnected, it will not be correct if
either (1) moral commitments can be derived through foundationalist argument (see below) and
are not always fulfilled or (2) moral commitments are derived from highly-qualified
conventionalist argument (see below) that is designed to identify the moral norm that best
discounted-fits the relevant empirical realities—a procedure that can yield determinant
conclusions in the realistic case in which the relevant data does not perfectly fit the moral norm
that it best discounted-fits.
In the other direction, I want to counter the contention of some readers that the corollary
of liberalism just articulated would require us to return to a pre-industrial-revolution agricultural
society (to abandon all or virtually all technology and revert to some imagined eighteenthcentury village life). For two reasons, this contention is completely unjustified. The first and
less important is that it implicitly underestimates the dangerousness of even “pre-industrialrevolution” agricultural labor and the toxicity of even pre-industrial fertilizer and agricultural
run-offs. The second and more important reason is that it ignores the fact that a great deal of
economic product is required to provide our society’s members and participants with the
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nutrition, clothing, housing, medical care, and education that they need to live as long lives as
they might under conditions that would give them an opportunity to take their lives morally
seriously. Certainly, a significant portion of contemporary Americans do not have the nutrition,
clothing, housing, health care, formal education, range of experiences, and other sorts of
opportunities with which I think our society’s liberal commitments entitle them to be supplied (if
it is technologically and economically possible to do so). I am optimistic that we could fulfill
this basic obligation of a liberal, rights-based society by redistributing resources and
opportunities to the poor and, most importantly, to the children of the poor—that our total
product would suffice for this purpose even if it were reduced in the short and medium run (i.e.,
before the relevant redistributions increased the productivity of the children of the poor and their
descendants) by the incentive-effects of the required redistribution. However, I doubt that we
could fulfill this obligation without engaging in industrial activities that would put at risk the
opportunity of some to lead a life of moral integrity, perhaps regardless of the way in which they
were carried out but certainly given the way in which they would be carried out despite the
State’s efforts to prevent their wrongful execution. It should be noted that this line of argument
may legitimate not only economic activities that directly produce the goods and services that
significantly contribute to individuals’ having a meaningful opportunity to lead a life of moral
integrity but also economic activities that produce other goods and services whose availability
provides the members of and participants in the society in question with an incentive to produce
life-of-moral-integrity-related goods and services. This point is made salient inter alia by the
postulate of liberal idealism, which (in the version I will be referencing) asserts that when acting
in non-political capacities the members of a liberal, rights-based society do not in general have
an obligation to provide others with goods and services that their governments are obligated to
secure for them.
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1.

The Morally-Legitimate, Internally-Correct Answer to Any Common-Law Legal-Rights
Question in the United States
Part 1 argues that (with one possible exception3) the internally-correct answer to any legal

issue that arises in a “common law of torts” case in the United States (the answer that is correct
as a matter of American law) is the answer warranted by a liberal conception of corrective justice
and explains in some detail the content of that conception of corrective justice. The following
argument explains the relationship between the morally-legitimate, internally-right answer to
common-law torts-questions in the United States and the liberal conception of torts-related
corrective-justice entitlements:
(1)

to be morally legitimate, the use of an argument to resolve a legal-rights question
or the answer given to a legal-rights question must be consistent with the moral
commitments of the society in which the legal analysis is being executed;

(2)

except to the extent that a contrary conclusion is warranted by the fact that the
relevant society’s constitution contains text that is inconsistent with its moral
commitments and whose import was properly understood by its ratifiers at the
time of ratification, no argument whose use is inconsistent with the moral
commitments of a society of moral integrity can ever be legally valid—i.e., can
ever count in disputes about the internally-correct resolution of a legal-rights
question in that society in a way that is inconsistent with that society’s moral
commitments—and no answer to a legal-rights question that is inconsistent with
such a society’s moral commitments can ever be internally correct;

(3)

the United States is a liberal, rights-based society of moral integrity;

(4)

neither the contemporary Constitution of the United States nor the constitution of
any individual state contains text that is relevant to the resolution of any moralrights-related tort-law issue that is inconsistent with our society’s moral
commitments;

3

The possible exception relates to cases in which a liberal, rights-based State may be obligated to provide a
legal entitlement to a victim who cannot establish that, more probably than not, any specific wrongdoer has been a
but-for course of his loss to recover some or all of his loss from wrongdoers who may have wrongfully caused his
loss and did wrongfully cause someone to suffer the type of loss he suffered. This possibility is explored in the
paper on the causation-element of corrective-justice claims to which I have already referred. The issue has arisen in
pharmaceutical cases in which the consumer cannot identify the specific company from which he bought a drug that
caused him harm that materialized long after his purchase, in some asbestositis cases, in at least one case involving
petroleum derivatives, and in a few hand-gun cases. In some of these cases, courts have dealt with this issue by
imposing market-share liability on each putative injurer. For a clear presentation of the case-law, see DAN V.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 176 at 430-32 (2000).
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A.

(5)

the governments of rights-based societies are morally obligated to enforce the
moral rights of those for whom they are responsible whenever they can do so
without sacrificing the on-balance rights-related interests of those for whom they
are responsible;

(6)

the governments of the United States need not sacrifice any rights-related interests
to enforce the corrective-justice tort-related moral rights of those for whom they
are responsible; therefore,

(7)

to the extent that the governments of the United States have chosen to fulfill their
obligations to secure the corrective-justice rights of the society’s members and
participants by creating common-law courts that are authorized to discover and
legally enforce the corrective-justice-related moral rights of their society’s
members and participants, those courts are obligated to base their conclusions in
common-law cases (including common-law tort cases) in which the parties are
asserting moral-rights-related legal rights on moral-rights arguments (on
arguments of moral principle) and to reach conclusions in those cases that are
consistent with the State’s obligation to secure the corrective-justice-related moral
rights of the parties.4

The Moral Type, Moral Character, and Basic Moral-Rights Commitment of the United
States
The preceding discussion clearly implies that the moral character, moral type, and moral

commitments of the United States determine both (1) the set of arguments that can be
legitimately and validly used to determine the content of the common law of torts in the United
States and (2) the content of that law. I will now delineate and explain the basis of my
conclusions about these issues.
Societies can be placed into three, broad moral-character categories. Some societies are
amoral (have no moral commitments); some are immoral (are committed to effectuating some
standard or achieving some goal whose effectuation or achievement is immoral—i.e., violates

4

This conclusion is consistent with the conclusion that it would be morally legitimate (i.e., consistent with
the relevant society’s moral commitments) for the legislature of a liberal, rights-based State to authorize courts that
also have common-law jurisdiction to apply tort legislation it passed that did not violate the corrective-justicerelated rights of any member of or participant in the society in question. Part III will explore inter alia the moral
legitimacy of the legislature of such a State’s authorizing courts to enact such tort legislation on their own. At this
juncture, I will confine myself to the following observation: even if it would be consistent with such a society’s
moral commitments for a legislature to authorize courts to enact legislation that would be applied only
prospectively, it would clearly be morally impermissible for such a legislature to enact such legislation and apply it
retrospectively (or for courts to enact and apply such legislation retrospectively without legislative authorization).
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some ineliminable, universally-applicable tenet of morality); and some have moral integrity (are
committed to a purported moral norm that is in fact moral and fulfill that commitment to some
hard-to-specify, requisite extent). In order to determine whether a particular society is amoral, is
immoral, or has moral integrity, it is necessary (1) to identify the decision-standard(s) it purports
to use or seems implicitly to use to resolve various issues, (2) to determine whether the identified
decision-standards are moral, immoral, or non-moral, and (3) to assess the extent to which its
members’ and governments’ conduct is consistent with the decision-standards they claim to be
using or the decision-standards their discourse, perceptions, and conduct imply they are using.
Societies of moral integrity can themselves be divided into two types—rights-based
societies and goal-based societies.5 The statement that a given culture is rights-based has two
predicates. First, members of a rights-based culture engage in two kinds of prescriptive-moral
discourse—moral-ought discourse about what an individual or the State morally-ought to do and
moral-rights discourse about what an individual or the State is morally obligated to do. Second,
in a rights-based culture, an individual cannot excuse or justicize (establish the justness of) a
choice that violates someone’s moral rights by demonstrating that it was consistent with the
personal ultimate values to which the individual subscribed, and the State cannot justicize a
choice that violates someone’s moral rights by demonstrating that it helped the State achieve one
or more goals the State is authorized to pursue. In other words, in a rights-based culture, moralrights claims are strongly distinguished from moral-ought claims, and moral-rights conclusions
(and the moral norms on which they are based—hereinafter “moral principles”) trump (are
lexically prior to) moral-ought conclusions and the moral norms from which they are derived
(hereinafter “personal ultimate values”). Of course, nothing in the preceding account of rightsbased cultures denies the reality that most individual and State choices in rights-based cultures
do not implicate the moral rights of the non-chooser—that even in rights-based cultures, the only
moral issue raised by most choices that have a moral dimension is what the relevant chooser
morally-ought to do.
5

Although some would argue that ideal-based societies should be distinguished from goal-based societies
and rights-based societies, I would classify ideal-based societies as a subtype of goal-based societies. Similarly,
although some would claim that religious-duty-based societies should be classified separately from goal-based
societies and rights-based societies, I would classify such societies as a variant of rights-based societies since their
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The statement that a society of moral integrity is goal-based implies that its members do
not draw a strong distinction between moral-ought discourse and moral-rights discourse.
Although members of a goal-based society may sometimes use moral-rights language, they do so
simply to communicate the strength or certainty of their view about what they think morallyought to be done.

Correlatively, although goal-based societies may have a category

“constitutional rights,” these rights are enforced only when doing so enables the State to achieve
its preferred goals—i.e., in goal-based societies, goals trump what they (to my mind,
misleadingly) call “rights” when the goals and “rights” favor different courses of conduct.
To determine whether a given society of moral integrity is goal-based or rights-based,
one must observe its members’ prescriptive-moral conduct and discourse and determine
(1)

whether they draw a strong distinction between moral-rights claims and moralought claims,

(2)

whether they conclude that, when the answer to something they may refer to as a
“moral-rights claim” conflicts with the answer that the evaluator would give to the
question “what morally-ought to de done,” the moral-rights conclusion trumps the
moral-ought conclusion, and

(3)

whether (relatedly) any individual who (government that) violates what is
sometimes called his (its) moral obligations because of his (its) sincere
commitment to a particular personal ultimate value (to achieving some goal) is
subjected to weighty moral censure on that account.

I assume that there is no single, objectively-true, universally-applicable moral norm on
which rights-based societies of moral integrity must be committed to grounding their moralrights-related conduct (or, for that matter, to which goal-based societies of moral integrity must
be exclusively committed). Since I believe that an appropriate “empirical” analysis6 would

members, like those of rights-based societies, strongly distinguish the right from the good and lexically order the
right over the good.
6
As the text implies, my approach to determining the moral commitments of a given society is “highlyqualified” conventionalist. I enquoted the word “empirical” because the highly-qualified conventionalist approach I
deem appropriate incorporates particular views about the nature and domain of moral norms—e.g., (1) that certain
purported decision-standards do not qualify as “moral norms” (i.e., that a decision-standard must have certain
attributes or cannot have other attributes if it is to qualify as a moral norm), (2) that a society of moral integrity must
have consistent commitments across its various domains of decisionmaking, etc. I want to indicate that, although I
have never been convinced by any purely-conceptual argument for the “objective truth” of a particular norm of
justice, I do not reject the possibility that some such foundationalist argument could succeed. For an account of the
various types of foundationalist approaches that have been used to identify the universally-applicable norm of justice
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reveal that the United States is a rights-based society of moral integrity, I will focus on the
protocol one should follow to identify the moral principle or moral-principle combination to
which a rights-based society is committed.
I think that two criteria must be used to evaluate the various possible candidates for a
given rights-based society’s “basic moral principle” title. The first relevant criterion is how
closely the post-dictions and predictions of various “candidates” for the “basic moral principle”
title fit the following facts: (A) the prescriptive-moral conduct of the members of the society and
their governments, (B) the moral-rights claims that its members, participants, and governments
made and did not make, (C) the arguments that were made and not made in support of the claims
in question both by the disputants and by those who evaluated their claims, (D) the conclusions
that were reached about the claims in question, (E) how close the “cases” in question were
perceived to be, and (F) how certain members of the relevant society were about the proper
resolution of the claims in question. The second relevant criterion is the extent to which the nonfits associated with each principle-candidate are explicable in terms that reduce the damage the
non-fits do to its candidacy—viz., the extent to which the non-fits can be explained by (A) the
greater power of the non-fits’ beneficiaries, (B) the presence of mechanical transaction costs or
other types of costs that made it unattractive for parties to pursue justified claims or attractive for
parties to pursue unjustified claims, (C) the fact that the relevant individuals did not adequately
consider the arguments they made, the conclusions they reached, or the conduct in which they
engaged, (D) conceptual intellectual errors that the relevant actors might very well have
committed, and/or (E) other sorts of errors that may have been committed by moral-right holders
or obligors or have been or might be committed by deciders of moral-rights disputes or moralrights-related legal-rights disputes. In brief, in my view, the basic moral principle of a rightsbased society is the moral norm that best discounted-fits its members’ and governments’ relevant
conduct, discourse, and perceptions where the non-fits associated with each “candidate” are
discounted by their discount-justifying explicability.

and the various types of conventionalist approaches that have been used to determine whether a given society is
moral, immoral, or amoral, to determine whether a given society of moral integrity is rights-based or goal-based, and
to identify the particular moral norm that a society of moral integrity is committed to instantiating, see Richard S.
Markovits, On the Relevance of Economic-Efficiency Conclusions, 29 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1, 50-54 (2001).
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I believe that the application of these criteria to the results of an acceptably-thorough
analysis of the prescriptive-moral discourse, perceptions, and conduct of members of our culture
would lead to the conclusion that ours is a liberal, rights-based society of moral integrity. More
specifically, such an investigation would yield the conclusion that ours is a rights-based culture
whose members and government(s) are obligated to show appropriate, equal respect and concern
for all moral-rights holders for whom they are or it is responsible.

The liberal duty of

appropriate, equal concern covers concern both (1) for the “welfare” of other members of the
society in the sense in which economists conceptualize “welfare” (see below) but pre-eminently
(2) for these creatures’ having the opportunity to actualize their potential to become and remain
persons of moral integrity by taking their obligations seriously and striving to establish a
reflective equilibrium between their personal value-convictions and their conduct.

This

conclusion reflects the fact that liberalism values lives of moral integrity more highly than
anything else. Although the required “empirical investigation” would take into account official
acts by government employees, political acts by private members of our culture when performing
political roles, and the conduct of various participants in adjudicatory proceedings, it would
primarily focus on the prescriptive-moral discourse, perceptions, and conduct of members of our
culture outside of governmental fora or electoral processes.
B.

The Tort-Related Corrective-Justice-Related Obligations of the Members and
Governments of a Liberal, Rights-Based State
This section analyzes the implications of a liberal, rights-based society’s generic

commitment to showing appropriate, equal respect and concern for all moral-rights holders for
whom it is responsible for (1) the tort-related moral obligations and rights of its members and
participants and (2) the obligations of its governments to secure the tort-related moral-rightsrelated interests of those for whom it is responsible. I want to reiterate that these issues are not
the types of issues with which many legal philosophers who have focused on the law of torts
have been concerned. Admittedly, a few philosophical analyses of tort law have tried to analyze
the implications of a particular value (say, libertarianism7) for the content of tort law in a State
that is committed to that value (without ever establishing that any particular society is committed
7

See Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 151 (1973).
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to the value in question). However, most tort-law-focused philosophical analyses are not “topdown”8 in the sense of starting with the value rather than with the law. In particular, most tortlaw-focused philosophical analyses start with the law and try to devise the “best” philosophical
(i.e., most-morally-attractive) account that can be given of our actual tort-law practice. This
orientation may well reflect the relevant authors’ subscription to the positivist position that legal
practice is self-validating and perhaps self-legitimating. Although I agree that a society’s legal
practice constitutes part of the universe of prescriptive-moral conduct, perceptions, and discourse
on which conclusions about a society’s moral character and commitments must be based, I
believe that legal practice constitutes only a small percentage of the relevant data and that
individual elements of and sometimes broad subsets of a society’s legal practice may be
inconsistent with its moral commitments and, therefore, internally incorrect. In any event, that is
why my philosophical analysis of tort law starts with our society’s moral commitments
(examines the implications for the common law of torts of my conclusion about our society’s
moral commitments) rather than with our society’s tort law (rather than trying to develop the
“best” philosophical account of our common-law-of-torts practice).
I also want to emphasize at the outset that—although the suggestions that follow are more
than casual ruminations—I recognize that several are contestable and may well be wrong. I am
particularly concerned about the third, “self-conception-related” corollary of liberalism, which
asserts that liberalism is specially concerned not only with losses that preclude people from
leading lives of moral integrity but also with losses that militate against their leading such lives
by affecting their self-conceptions in ways that make it less likely that they will take their moral
agency and hence their moral lives seriously.

More specifically, my concern about this

suggestion is less that it may be false but more that the specific types of losses and constraints
that undermine our self-respect in the relevant way may vary from society to society and from
group to group or individual to individual within a given society and that the resulting
“squishiness” of this category of losses may undermine the practicability of the liberal approach
to tort law as a whole.
For somewhat different reasons, I am also troubled by the “non-uniqueness” qualification
to the basic liberal duty to rescue that I suggest liberalism may warrant. At least in part, I have
8

See Coleman, op. cit. supra note 1 at 184.
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been led to propose this qualification to render compatible with liberalism some of our legal
system’s failure to recognize duties to rescue that one would otherwise conclude liberalism
would impose. Although I do think that my discussion of this qualification is relevant and worth
considering, I cannot say that I find it thoroughly convincing.
In any event, even if in the end you conclude that one or more of what I claim are tortrelated corollaries of liberalism cannot be said to be so, I hope that my discussion of them will
make a contribution by stimulating constructive criticism and the articulation of superior
alternatives. If the tone of the rest of Part I is confident, the author is not.
(1)

The Tort-Related Obligations of the Members of a Liberal, Rights-Based Society
My tentative view is that the concrete tort-duty implications of the generic liberal duty of

appropriate, equal respect and concern is captured by seven corollaries of liberalism or related
sets of such corollaries. Before discussing these corollaries, I want to point out a presupposition
of the first five that economists will find uncongenial—viz., that, from the relevant, liberal
perspective, not all benefits and harms are commensurable. Economists (or perhaps I should say
the overwhelming majority of economists who believe that it is always desirable to make the
choice that maximizes “welfare” in the sense of maximizing utility, pleasure, satisfaction, or the
kind of “well-being” that is connected with such concepts and the minority of economists who
admit that at least some members of our society are committed to a coherent value that implies
that the desirability of a choice depends in whole or in part on its impact on the distribution of
such “welfare”) implicitly assume that all effects of any choice are commensurable. More
specifically, in their view, all effects of any choice can be measured in units of utility or pleasure.
I doubt that the assumption of commensurability would be justified even if all evaluations should
focus exclusively on the kind of well-being with which most economists seem to be exclusively
concerned. In particular, I doubt that a single metric can be used to measure such varied psychic
experiences as pleasure, satisfaction, ecstasy, unease, unhappiness, terror, etc. However, even if
all effects of a choice were commensurable from the perspective of any value that focuses
exclusively on such well-being, various effects of choices would not be commensurable from the
perspective of the liberal norm on which corrective-justice conclusions must be based in our
society.
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Thus, as the first corollary of liberalism I will discuss asserts, from a liberal perspective,
any pleasure or satisfaction that an actor obtains by inflicting otherwise-unjusticized pain on,
degrading, or controlling another does not count the same for a liberal as the other sorts of
pleasures that a choice can confer on the actor. And as all the remaining corollaries of liberalism
I will delineate manifest, from a liberal perspective, the conventional pleasures that a choice
yields are not commensurable with the loss an individual sustains when a private or
governmental choice deprives him of the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity by killing
him, depriving him of the neurological prerequisites for acting as a moral agent, or perhaps
subjecting him to life-dominating pain or when a private or governmental choice strongly
militates against his seizing the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity by inflicting losses on
him that in the circumstances in question cause him to doubt his authorship of his own life and
hence to question his moral responsibility for his actions.
Because the point of the preceding paragraph is critical, I want to restate it somewhat
differently. Economists who are concerned exclusively with the maximization or distribution of
welfare or utility as they understand those concepts value protecting moral-rights holders’ lives,
neurological prerequisites for leading a life of moral integrity, privacy, and psychological
capacity to lead a life of moral integrity to the extent that the relevant protections increase the
utility of their direct beneficiaries and any others they affect. Liberalism values the promotion of
lives of moral integrity not primarily because the promotion of such lives increases utility but
because it values such lives in themselves. Indeed, liberalism considers promoting lives of moral
integrity to be a higher-order value than increasing mere utility. In the current context, this
conclusion is salient because it implies that the fact that a choice maximizes utility as economists
understand this concept cannot justicize it if it deprives people of the opportunity to lead a life of
moral integrity or militates against moral-rights holders’ seizing this opportunity by undermining
their sense of being the authors of their own lives.9 The second through seventh corollaries of
liberalism I will discuss all reflect this fact.

9

Another corollary of the fact that liberals value the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity in itself is
that liberals would not base their assessment of the value of this opportunity or of the privacy and self-ownership
whose protection fosters people’s taking their lives morally seriously by the value that the beneficiaries of such
protection and opportunities would place on them if they were maximizers and were perfectly informed about the
kinds of things that the economist’s conception of individual sovereignty implicates. Although my conclusion that
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In any event, I suspect that most economists will reject the various corollaries of
liberalism I will delineate because they will reject the incommensurability premises they
manifest. If experience is any guide, many economists will attempt to justify their rejection of
these corollaries by arguing that the liberal value that supposedly underlies them is incoherent in
the sense of having no substantive content. In so doing, they will be repeating their standard
mistake of assuming that the fact that the extensions of some concept are contestable or cannot
be derived mechanically from its linguistic definition implies that the concept has no denotation.
I hasten to point out, however, that various philosophically-inclined lawyers who have
taken an interest in corrective justice and at least some judges share my perception that our
society regards at least some of the harms and benefits that wrongdoing can generate to be
incommensurate. For example, Hanoch Dagan has noted with approval the fact that the measure
of recovery that is available in “unjust enrichment” suits—compensation for harm suffered, “fair
market value” of the resource taken, or profits realized by the wrongdoer—depends on whether
in the society in question the resources taken “are viewed merely as valuable assets that have no
direct bearing on the identity of their holder” or are “attached to [their] holder’s identity”—i.e.,
on whether the resources taken are “fungible” or “constitutive.”10
(A)

The First, Illicit-Satisfaction Corollary of Liberalism
The first of the seven corollaries of liberalism that I think are relevant to the analysis of

the tort-related corrective-justice-related rights of the members of and participants in a liberal,
rights-based State is that such individuals cannot justicize imposing a tort-type loss on someone
else by citing the satisfaction or equivalent-dollar gain they obtain from inflicting otherwiseunjusticized pain on the other, from degrading the other, and/or from controlling the other. To
the contrary, rather than counting for the justness of the conduct in question, the fact that it yields
satisfaction for these sorts of reasons counts against its “moral permissibility” (i.e., in my usage,

ours is a liberal, rights-based society reflects my belief that most members of our culture value leading a life of
moral integrity in the way that liberalism does, the fact that some members of our society do not would not affect the
liberal evaluation of choices that alter the opportunities people have to lead such lives and/or the likelihood that they
will take advantage of these opportunities (as it would the utilitarian or allocative-efficiency-oriented evaluation of
such choices).
10
See Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 138 at 140, 142,
and 155 (1999) and, more generally, HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1997).
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counts against its consistency with such a society’s moral-rights commitments)—indeed, may
actually guarantee its moral impermissibility (say, when these types of satisfaction critically
affected the chooser’s decision to make the choice in question). This first, tort-related corollary
of liberalism is most relevant to such torts as invasions of privacy, assault, battery, false
imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
(B)

The Second, “Opportunity to Lead a Life of Moral Integrity”-Related Corollary of
Liberalism
The second corollary of liberalism that relates to the tort obligations of members of a

liberal, rights-based society applies to the assessment of avoidance-move rejections that may
deprive their victims of the opportunity to lead lives of moral integrity—say, by killing them, by
depriving them of the neurological prerequisites for leading a life of moral integrity, or (perhaps,
if this concept is not disqualifyingly “squishy”) by causing them to experience pain that
dominates their lives sufficiently to prevent them from considering their obligations, devising
their personal conception of the good, and striving to lead a life that is consonant with this
conception. According to this corollary, a moral agent who is a potential injurer who knows or
ought to have known that his choice might impose a life-of-moral-integrity-precluding loss on
another extant rights-bearer will be able to justicize his choice if and only if, after doing
appropriate research, he concluded that ex ante his choice should not be predicted to disserve the
on-balance, weighted-average “having the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity”-related
interests of those for whom he was responsible.11
Thus, the second tort-related corollary of liberalism implies that a pharmaceutical
manufacturer whose production would put toxins in the air that will cause some to die or to
11

I do not think that a potential injurer can render legitimate a choice that violates this corollary of liberalism
by securing his potential victims’ consent to the choice in question by paying them for this consent. Liberalism
cannot countenance ex ante consent to the type of choice in question (at least if the society has fulfilled its obligation
to provide each rights-bearer for whom it is responsible with the material wherewithal for leading a life of moral
integrity so that the consent would not serve the consenter’s or his beneficiaries’ interests in having the opportunity
to lead lives of moral integrity by providing them with material prerequisites for leading such lives that they
otherwise would have lacked). Nor do I think that the government of a liberal, rights-based State can discharge the
obligations it has in relation to this corollary of liberalism by insuring that all victims of its violation receive
compensation from the violator who harmed them. Since, from a liberal perspective, this harm is not compensable,
this corollary imposes a duty on the government of a liberal, rights-based State to do everything it can do to prevent
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experience chronic pain that disables them from leading a life of moral integrity would be able to
justicize his production-decision only if, after doing appropriate research, he reasonably
concluded that the weighted-average-expected number of days of lives of moral integrity that his
output (or the last units of his output) would give people the opportunity to lead by helping them
survive or easing their pain was not smaller than the weighted-average-expected number of days
of lives of moral integrity he should expect the pollution it would generate to deprive people of
the opportunity to lead by killing moral-rights holders, depriving them of the neurological
prerequisites for leading a life of moral integrity, or subjecting them to life-dominating pain..
Five sets of points need to be made about this corollary of liberalism. The first two are
equally applicable to the third corollary of liberalism. I am uncertain about two features of the
“opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity”-oriented obligation that liberal, rights-based
societies are committed to instantiating. Thus, I am uncertain about whether the second and third
corollaries should assert that the relevant choosers are obligated to base their avoidance-decision
on the prediction they should make of its net impact on (1) the number of days of lives of moral
integrity that relevant individuals are prevented from having the opportunity to lead by death,
neurological disability, or chronic pain or (2) the number of extant persons who are prevented by
death, neurological disability, or pain from leading lives of moral integrity (though, as the
preceding paragraph suggests, I am inclined to think that the former metric is the appropriate
standard).

Somewhat relatedly, I am also uncertain about whether the second and third

corollaries of liberalism should deem relevant any tendency of an avoidance-move rejection to
affect the number of individuals with the neurological prerequisites to lead lives of moral
integrity that are born (though I am inclined to think it should not).12
Second, the second corollary of liberalism (and the third) will at least sometimes imply
the fault and hence liability of an injurer who would not be deemed “negligent” in the sense in
which that concept is operationalized through the variant of the Hand formula that would be

violations of this corollary that would not preclude it from securing weightier rights-based interests by reducing the
society’s other types of economic output.
12
See John Broome, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Population in Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and
Philosophical Perspectives (Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, eds.) 117 (2002). For some comments on Broome’s
analysis of this issue, see Richard S. Markovits, Book Review, ___ ETHICS ___ (2004)—a review of COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (MATTHEW D. ADLER AND ERIC A. POSNER,
eds.) (2002).
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appropriate to use to assess the wrongfulness of conduct that might generate mere-utility losses
but could not generate life-of-moral-integrity-related losses in ways other than by reducing the
victims’ material resources below the level they must have to be in a position to take the moral
dimension of their lives seriously. In part, this conclusion reflects the fact that the calculation on
which the second corollary bases its fault conclusion ignores the rejection-decision’s impact on
things other than the number of days of moral integrity that relevant individuals have the
opportunity to lead. However, even if this were not the case, the outcome of a Hand calculation
might not be the same as the outcome of the second corollary’s calculation because (as I have
already indicated), unlike the Hand formula, the second corollary does not value the “costs” and
“benefits” on which it focuses by the equivalent-dollar value that those who experience these
effects place on them (or even by the equivalent-dollar value they would place on them, given
their conception of the good, if they were otherwise perfectly informed).
Third, I want to point out that this second corollary can be, has been, and perhaps should
be articulated in a way that is consistent with the postulate of liberal dualism, which
distinguishes the obligations of the participants in a liberal, rights-based State when acting in
their private capacities and the obligations of such a State itself and correlatively of its members
when performing political roles. More specifically, the variant of the postulate of liberal dualism
that I use in the current context asserts that—because the private conduct of the individual
participants in a liberal, rights-based society did not, in general, cause or make them morally
responsible for the extant variations in their co-participants’ income/wealth positions13 or in
various attributes of these individuals themselves that affect their abilities to take advantage of
any opportunity they have to lead a life of moral integrity—the private duties of the individual
participants in a liberal, rights-based society do not (in general) depend on the leading-a-life-ofmoral-integrity-related consequences of their choices that reflect the fact that the income/wealth
positions of those the relevant choices affect deviate from the society-average or the fact that
those the relevant choices affect have other non-average characteristics that influence their
ability to seize an opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity. Hence, although when acting in

13

In a society in which materialism plays a significant role, not only the absolute income/wealth position of
an individual but also his relative income/wealth position may affect his ability to take advantage of an opportunity
to lead a life of moral integrity by affecting his self-respect.
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political capacities, participants in a liberal, rights-based State are morally obligated to ensure
that those for whom their society is responsible have the money, more specific kinds of
resources, experiences, and opportunities that critically affect their ability to take their lives
morally seriously, the private-law duties of such individuals do not in general reflect such
considerations—i.e., require only that such individuals do not make choices that disserve the
interest of relevant individuals in having the opportunity to lead lives of moral integrity by
killing them directly, depriving them of the neurological prerequisites for leading such lives, or
subjecting them to life-dominating pain (do not require that potential injurers take account of the
possibility that the loss an avoidance-move they have rejected might have prevented would have
militated against its victims’ taking their lives morally seriously by depriving them of the
nutrition, housing, medical care, education, or other experiences that are prerequisites of their
making meaningful moral choices).
Fourth, I want to concretize this second postulate and use the examples in question to
respond to the objection I mentioned in the Introduction that it would require us to revert to a
pre-industrial-revolution economy. I will use three examples for this purpose.
The first focuses on the decision of a pharmaceutical manufacturer to produce additional
units of a product that would prolong the life or critically reduce the pain of its consumers in the
face of the fact that—even if carefully executed—the production of these drugs would generate
pollution that shortened the lives of victims who inhaled or ingested it, would deprive them of
the neurological capacity to lead lives of moral integrity, or would subject them to lifedominating pain. The second corollary implies that such a company’s production of the relevant
units of its product would have been wrongful unless
(1)

after doing appropriate research (see the fifth set of corollaries), it reasonably
concluded that no alternative method of producing its last units of output or all its
output would have been ranked higher under an opportunity-to-lead-a-life-ofmoral-integrity metric (see below);

(2)

after doing appropriate research, it reasonably concluded that its last units of
production and its overall output would not disserve the on-balance interest of the
society’s members and participants in having and taking advantage of the
opportunity to lead lives of moral integrity because its decision to produce these
units would promote that interest more by helping its customers recover from
injury or illness, by easing their pain, and/or by inducing others to supply goods
or services that increased the opportunity of the society’s members and
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participants to lead lives of moral integrity than it would disserve the relevant
interests of these individuals by exposing its victims to the toxins it put in the air;
and perhaps
(3)

although it did not do appropriate research and/or did not properly consider the
information at its disposal, those failures did not cause it to make a choice that
disserved the relevant on-balance interests of the society’s members and
participants.

Some explanation is required. As I indicated in the Introduction, an act or activity that
does not increase someone’s opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity “directly” by prolonging
his life, preserving his relevant neurological capacities, or relieving him of life-dominating pain
may do so “indirectly” by providing him with needed nutrition, clothing, housing, medical care,
or education. Acts or activities can perform this latter function either by supplying such goods
and services themselves or by providing goods and services whose availability provides others
with the incentive to provide such services.

Although relevantly-dangerous choices by

pharmaceutical companies may be particularly likely to be rendered non-wrongful by their direct
tendency to increase the opportunity that some relevant individuals have to lead a life of moral
integrity, the choices of such companies may also generate this type of benefit indirectly by
providing others with an incentive to produce needed goods or services.
The second example focuses on the decision of a manufacturer of some product to
transport the goods it produces in a way that, in comparison with the situation that would prevail
if it did not produce these goods, creates a risk that individuals who are potential victims of
vehicular accidents in which its transport vehicles will be involved or of the pollution those
vehicles will generate will on those accounts lose the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity.
The second corollary implies that such a company’s decision to transport its output in the way in
question will be wrongful unless it can demonstrate that, at least as probably as not, one or both
of the following two propositions are true:
(1)

after doing appropriate research, it reasonably concluded that a switch to any
alternative method of transportation that would have served the interest of
relevant individuals in having the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity by
reducing the relevant types of accident or pollution losses would not have served
those interests on balance because—by increasing the company’s marginal
costs—it would have induced it to reduce its output in circumstances in which the
production, more dangerous transport, and consumption of the eliminated units
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would have promoted the goal of increasing the opportunity relevant individuals
have to lead a life of moral integrity on balance or
(2)

although it did not do appropriate research and/or failed to process the
information at its disposal appropriately, these failures did not cause it to make a
choice that disserved the relevant on-balance interest of relevant individuals.

In this more general case, it is less likely that any reduction in the number of units produced
would deprive individuals of an opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity directly and
therefore more likely that it would have to do so indirectly by reducing the incentives of others to
produce needed nutrition, clothing, housing, medical care, and education for the use of the more
dangerous method of transport to be non-wrongful.
The third example focuses on a decision by a private actor to take a pleasure-drive in a
car that he reasonably believed to be appropriately safe that he would operate appropriately
carefully. Since even when driven carefully a car whose driver reasonably and perhaps correctly
believed to be safe may be involved in an accident that will deprive someone of the opportunity
to lead a life of moral integrity and may generate pollution that has this effect—indeed, may
have such consequences for others whose losses cannot be partly attributed to wrongful choices
that they made, does this second tort-related corollary of liberalism imply the wrongfulness of
such pleasure-drives? Since I recognize that this implication would not fit our societal practice, I
would like to be able to provide reasons why this corollary might not deem such pleasure-driving
wrongful.
I can think of at least three such reasons. First, virtually all activities create such risks.
An enormous number of opportunity-to-lead-a-life-of-moral-integrity-depriving accidents occur
around the home. Careful pleasure-driving may not create significantly more dangers of this
kind than the other activities people would substitute for it.
Second, the option of taking careful pleasure-drives may motivate some people to supply
more or more valuable market labor and the increase in their market product that results may
increase the opportunity that others have to lead a life of moral integrity either directly (because
the extra goods produced are goods whose supply to them critically affects their opportunity to
lead such a life) or indirectly (because the availability of this extra output induces others to
produce goods or services whose production increases the extent to which relevant individuals
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have the material, formal-educational, and experiential prerequisites for leading a life of moral
integrity).14
The third reason why the second tort-related corollary of liberalism may not imply the
wrongfulness of pleasure-driving is connected to the third tort-related corollary of liberalism I
will delineate. Like this third corollary, it derives from a belief that people will not seize the
opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity unless they consider themselves to be morally
responsible for their own choices and that private actions and legal rules that strongly limit their
options will militate against their doing so by preventing them from concluding that they are the
authors of their own lives. In the current context, this concern creates the possibility that any
conclusion that pleasure-driving of the type described is wrongful would on balance disserve the
goal of promoting lives of moral integrity by deterring people from seizing the opportunity to
lead such lives by altering their self-conceptions in a way that makes it less likely that they will
take their lives morally seriously.
The fifth and final set of points I want to make about the second tort-related corollary of
liberalism concerns its relationship to various other proposals for holding liable injurers whose
rejection-choices would not be deemed to violate a Hand-type test that was universally applied to
all harm-inflicting choices (including, for example, activity-level choices and choices to enter or
stay in business). In particular, various judges and scholars have argued for the internal-to-law
correctness and/or (moral) legitimacy15 of imposing strict liability on one or more of the
14

The preceding discussions of transport choice focused on the implications of liberalism for the “transportrelated” obligations of commercial concerns and possible pleasure-drivers. The second tort-related corollary of
liberalism also has implications for the transport obligations of the governments of a liberal, rights-based State.
Unless these governments could not supply the relevant public transport without reducing other expenditures that
would promote the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity to a greater extent, they would be obligated to supply
such transport facilities or to induce private parties to do so if such transport would be safer in the relevant respects
than purely private transport. Of course, this conclusion would be relevant to the pleasure-driving case only if the
pleasure-driver did not value the driving in itself but wanted to drive to get to a location in which he could engage in
a desired leisure activity. I should add that I can also imagine circumstances in which the governments of a liberal,
rights-based State would be obligated to try to educate their society’s members and participants not to have
preferences whose satisfaction would create dangers that would be of particular concern to liberals.
15
The textual distinction between the “internal-to-law correctness” and “moral legitimacy” of a legal
conclusion assumes that valid legal argument (argument that is supposed to be relevant to the resolution of questions
about the substantive content of existing law in the society in question) can generate internally-right answers to at
least some extant-legal-rights questions in that society that are morally illegitimate. An answer to a legal-rights
question is internal-to-law correct (correct as a matter of law) if it is the unique answer generated by valid legal
argument in the society in question. An answer to such a question is (morally) legitimate if it is consistent with the
relevant society’s moral commitments. As item “(2)” in the list included in the first paragraph of Part 1 indicates, an
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following possibly-partially-overlapping sets of injurers whose avoidance-move rejections were
not allocatively inefficient (whose avoidance-choices would not be deemed negligent if an
appropriately-revised Hand formula were used to assess their negligence):
(1)

all injurers who cause any type of harm covered by tort-law;16

(2)

injurers engaged in an “abnormally dangerous” activity even if (A) the activity
were carried out with due care and (B) the chooser’s location-choice and activitylevel choice were not allocatively inefficient if its “value” to the “community”
was outweighed by the danger it posed;17

internal-to-law correct legal conclusion may be morally illegitimate if it is based on a textual argument that focuses
on a morally-illegitimate provision of the relevant society’s constitution. Of course, if this provision is sufficiently
important, the relevant society’s failure to pass a constitutional amendment that eliminates it will call the society’s
moral integrity into question.
16
See Epstein, op. cit. supra note 7.
17
This proposal is derived from §§519-20 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS and (possibly) from the
case-law on so-called “ultrahazardous activities” that the RESTATEMENT purports to summarize. More specifically,
this proposal amounts to an allocative-efficiency-oriented interpretation of some language in these sections that
might be read to imply that the case-law holds activities to be strictly liable as ultrahazardous only if—in addition to
meeting the other criteria for this classification—their location and/or intensity is allocatively inefficient—an
interpretation under which an activity’s location is deemed “inappropriate” if and only if it is allocatively inefficient
and an activity’s “value to the community” is deemed to be “outweighed by its dangerous attributes” only if the
activity altogether or the activity-level that prevailed is allocatively inefficient. If this condition must be fulfilled for
an activity to be an ultrahazardous activity and hence subject to strict liability, the doctrine would impose strict
liability only on injurers whose choices were negligent in the sense in which economists assume the Hand formula
defines negligence (but would not be assessed for negligence under our current practice). The doctrine has clearly
been invoked in some cases in which there was no evidence that the injurer had made an allocatively-inefficient
activity-level or location choice—e.g., in cases involving fires caused by trucks delivering gasoline to urban gas
stations. Before proceeding, I should emphasize that I do not think that this allocative-efficiency-oriented
interpretation of these sections of the RESTATEMENT is correct. As the next paragraph of the text suggests, I believe
that the key terms in these sections should be interpreted in the way that would make the legal position they
articulate identical to my second, life-of-moral-integrity-related liberal postulate.
In any event, two further points should be made about the RESTATEMENT’s list of determinants of the
ultrahazardous status of an activity. First, the RESTATEMENT lists as separate determinants of ultrahazardousness
whether the activity creates a high probability of loss and whether the activity creates a probability of a high loss.
The reason why the relevant determinant is not the size of the weighted-average-expected loss is obscure. Second, it
is also not clear why the uncommonness of an activity is relevant to its ultrahazardous status or the appropriateness
of imposing strict liability on those who engage in it. Perhaps the RESTATEMENT’s drafters and ratifiers thought that
the likelihood that an activity’s victims could engage in most-allocatively-efficient avoidance is inversely related to
its uncommonness. If so, I am skeptical of this empirical generalization. For a case in which the uncommonness of
the defendant’s activity seems to have played a role, see Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11, 250 N.E.2d 31 (1969)
(blasting).
One final point may be worth making. The proposal that this note discusses is related to a slightly-different
proposal by Landes and Posner that industries be held strictly liable in their infancy but liable only when found
negligent in relation to precautions taken when mature. See William Landes and Richard Posner, The Positive
Economic Theory of Tort-Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1981). I have not listed this proposal in the text because Landes
and Posner believe that it can be justified by its allocative efficiency (though, admittedly, this claim is different from
the claim that it could be justicized as an approach to holding liable injurers who more probably than not were
negligent). For an explanation of why this proposal cannot be justified in allocative-efficiency terms and a critique
of the contrary argument made by Landes and Posner, see Richard S. Markovits, The Allocative Efficiency of
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(3)

injurers who made a choice that (A) caused a kind of loss covered by tort law in a
way covered by tort law and (B) unilaterally imposed on another a risk of a
substantial loss of a type covered by tort law;18

(4)

injurers who made a harmful choice that (A) imposed a unilateral risk on its
potential victims and (B) imposed an actual tort-law-covered loss of any
magnitude on a victim;19

(5)

injurers who made a harmful choice that (A) imposed a unilateral risk on a victim
who (B) could not increase allocative efficiency by avoiding the loss he
suffered;20 and

(6)

injurers who (A) made a choice that imposed a unilateral risk on its victim, (B)
had the capacity to foresee that their choice might harm someone else, and (C)
had the ability and opportunity to prevent the harm that resulted.21

With one possible exception, the second tort-related corollary of liberalism differs from
all these proposals in two respects. First, unlike these alternative proposals, it applies only when
the loss in question deprives the victim of the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity in ways
other than by reducing his material resources below the level needed to make his formal
opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity valuable.22 Second, unlike these alternatives, it
recognizes that injurers who have imposed the kind of loss on some victims that triggers its
Shifting From a “Negligence” System to a “Strict-Liability” Regime in Our Highly-Pareto-Imperfect Economy: A
Partial and Preliminary Third-Best-Allocative-Efficiency Analysis, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11, 123-32 (1998).
18
See Bolton v. Stone, A.C. 850 (H.L.) (1951).
19
George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
20
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520 A contains an example of a falling airplane that seems to be
designed to reveal the salience of the victim’s inability to engage in allocatively-efficient avoidance.
21
See Stephen Perry Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW
OF TORTS (Gerald Postema, ed.) 72 (2001).
22
Even those proposals that cover choices that have imposed substantial losses are different from the second
tort-related corollary of liberalism in this regard because
(1)
many substantial losses do not directly deprive their victims of life or the ability to take their lives
morally seriously by diminishing their neurological capacities or subjecting them to dominating
pain,
(2)
although some substantial reductions in the kind of welfare on which economists tend to focus
may so overwhelm the victim as to prevent him from thinking of anything else, most will not,
(3)
most substantial reductions in material welfare will not lower any of their victims’ positions to a
level that requires them to concentrate all their efforts on surviving and securing minimal comfort
or deprive them of the education or other types of experiences that may critically affect their
opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity, and
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applicability can still exonerate themselves and escape liability by demonstrating that they
should not have expected their choice to decrease on balance the extent to which the relevant
population has the opportunity to lead lives of moral integrity.23 The possible exception is the
(4)

liberal dualism implies that injurers whose choices have deprived their victims of the opportunity
to lead a life of moral integrity by reducing their material welfare below some minimal level are
not morally responsible for this outcome.
23
Some comments on the persuasiveness of these strict-liability proposals may be in order. Supporters of the
first proposal have claimed that it is required by libertarian values—that just as each individual’s self-ownership
implies his entitlement (inter alia) to the fruits of his own labor, it implies his obligation to compensate those whom
he has harmed. At least two objections to this position are worth noting. First, its proponents have failed to supply
either a foundationalist argument establishing the universal, objective truth of libertarian values or a conventionalist
argument establishing that our society is committed to libertarian values. Second, as Stephen Perry has pointed out,
this libertarian argument does not respond satisfactorily to the reality that tort losses are “scientifically caused” by
the victim as much as by the injurer. See Stephen Perry, The Impossibility of a General Strict Liability, 1
CANADIAN J. OF LAW AND JUR. 197, 161-66 (1988) and op. cit. supra note 21 at 85-86. More specifically,
libertarian theorists have responded to this difficulty either by developing a non-standard theory of causation that
manifests various normative assumptions that are at least contestable and are not in any event particularly linked to
libertarian values. Those assumptions include a distinction between acting in the world and passivity whose
meaning and moral significance are problematic.
At least if its key terms are interpreted in an allocative-efficiency-oriented way, I also do not grasp how one
can justify from a corrective-justice-related perspective the variant of the RESTATEMENT’s ultrahazardous-activity
provision that would make those engaged in such activities strictly liable even though their location-choices and
activity-level choices were not more likely than not to have been negligent. Admittedly, the second and third tortrelated corollaries of liberalism I articulate do imply that participants in an allocatively-efficient ultrahazardous
activity that is being carried out with due care have an obligation to compensate victims for certain types of losses
they imposed on them even though (1) the injurers did not want to cause such losses and (2) the losses in question
were not the “result” of their choice (in the sense of being an effect entailed by a given description of their choice)
but a consequence of their choice. (I have borrowed this distinction from Perry, op. cit. supra note 21 at 72-73.)
However, the second and third corollaries do not imply that participants in ultrahazardous activities are morally
obligated to compensate their victims for any type of loss they imposed on them and do imply that injurers who are
not engaged in ultrahazardous activities (whose activities are common or do not create a high probability of a
substantial loss) are obligated to compensate their victims for certain types of losses they imposed on them.
I also do not understand the corrective-justice force of the third proposal in the list the text presents.
Neither the substantial size of the loss nor the fact that the injurer imposed a unilateral risk on his victim seems
morally salient to me. Both the second corollary of liberalism and the third imply that the character of the loss in
question is more relevant than its victim-valuated equivalent-dollar magnitude to its sufferer’s right of redress.
Moreover, both practice and principle call into question the moral relevance of the reciprocal character of the risk to
which the injurer and victims have exposed each other. In particular, for two reasons, I do not think that the moral
entitlements of victims are extinguished by the fact that they have imposed reciprocal risks on their injurers. First,
although the factual predicate of the reciprocal-risk argument may be realistic in some cases—e.g., in vehiclevehicle accidents, it is almost certainly not realistic in the pharmaceutical case or in vehicle-pedestrian accidents.
Second, even if the two drivers involved in a single-victim, vehicle-vehicle accident in which no-one was negligent
in the standard Hand sense would be deemed equally at fault if fault were assessed by applying some opportunity-tolead-a-life-of-moral-integrity-oriented metric because each imposed the same risk of loss on the other and all other
relevant considerations were also equal, this fact would not justify the conclusion that the victim should bear all of
the resulting loss. Both in principle and in our legal practice, the fact that Y has behaved wrongfully by creating a
risk that X may suffer a loss does not relieve X of the responsibility to compensate Y for a loss X wrongfully
imposed on Y—regardless of whether the risk that Y imposed on X ever materialized. Admittedly, in many
reciprocal-risk-creation situations, the victim of the actual loss (Y in the above example) will not only have
wrongfully created a risk that his injurer X will suffer a loss but will also have committed wrongful acts that
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position of the common law (as represented by §§519-20 of the RESTATEMENT [SECOND]

OF

TORTS) on “abnormally dangerous” activities that are not relieved from liability by their “value”
to the “community”—at least if in legal practice (1) activities are treated as “abnormally
dangerous” if they create a risk that an extant person (someone who has the requisite potential to
lead a life of moral integrity) will be precluded from leading a life of moral integrity and (2) the
“value” of an activity to the “community” is defined in this context to depend solely on the
activity’s contribution to the number of days of lives of moral integrity that relevant individuals
have an opportunity to lead—i.e., if in legal practice activities are deemed to be “strictly liable”
because ultrahazardous if and only if on balance they disserve the interest of those for whom the
community is responsible in being in a position to lead a life of moral integrity.
(C)

The Third, “Self-Conception-Related” Corollary of Liberalism
The third corollary of liberalism that is relevant to the tort obligations of the members of

a liberal, rights-based society is that conduct (say, an invasion of the privacy of a loved one
motivated exclusively by a desire to learn more about the person loved) may be tortious because
it injures self-conception-related interests of the victim on which liberals place an especially-high
value even if the injurer does not obtain illicit satisfaction from the acts in question (e.g., from
contributed to the risk of his suffering a loss himself. However, as our legal practice (comparative negligence)
increasingly reflects, the proper way to respond to situations in which the victim’s loss has been caused by his own
as well as his injurer’s wrongful conduct is not to bar the victim’s recovery but to reduce it by the percentage that his
fault constituted of the combined fault of the victim and injurer. For a discussion of various related issues, see
Jennifer Arlen, Liability for Physical Injury When Injurers as Well as Victims Suffer Losses, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
411 (1992) and Re-examining Liability Rules When Injurers as Well as Victims Suffer Losses, 10 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 233 (1990).
As my discussion of the fourth tort-related corollary of liberalism I will distinguish should make clear, I
also doubt that injurers who have imposed unilateral risks on their victims should be required on that account to
compensate them for any type of loss of any size they inflicted on them non-negligently. My skepticism on this
issue carries over to the fifth tort-related corollary of liberalism I will delineate, which would impose a
compensation-duty on injurers who imposed unilateral risks on victims who could not engage in allocativelyefficient avoidance. Although the contributory negligence of his victim is certainly relevant to the existence or
extent of the compensation obligations of someone who would otherwise have a duty to compensate his victims, the
fact that an injurer’s victim was not contributorily negligent does not establish a basis for holding an injurer liable in
the absence of a positive reason for doing so.
Finally, I do not understand why the fact that an injurer has outcome-responsibility for a particular loss
(had the ability to foresee and prevent the outcome) that eventuated from a unilateral risk he imposed on his victim
justicizes requiring the injurer to compensate his victim for the loss in question. Although I recognize the
connection between an individual’s having outcome responsibility for some event and that event’s being a product
of his human agency, I do not see why his outcome-responsibility provides a basis for holding him liable, regardless
of whether his victim had imposed a reciprocal risk on him.
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any tendency they have to inflict pain on, degrade, or control the victim) and even if the act in
question does not directly preclude its victim from leading a life of moral integrity. More
completely, this corollary of liberalism proclaims that an injurer (possibly a government) who
has invaded his victim’s privacy, significantly harmed his victim’s body, significantly restricted
his victim’s freedom to choose (given his budget constraint), or taken an unacceptably-high
percentage or amount of an individual’s earned or unearned income—at least if the “injurer” has
done so without obtaining the “loser’s” ex ante consent—is obligated to compensate his victim
for the attendant loss (regardless of whether this outcome was “a result” of the act in question in
the technical sense of being entailed by that action as described or a consequence of the act)
unless the choice in question served the ex ante, on-balance, weighted-average interest of the
relevant population in having and being able to take advantage of the opportunity to lead a life of
moral integrity. As I have already indicated, the basic moral commitment of a liberal, rightsbased society is to individuals’ who have the requisite neurological capacity being given the
opportunity to lead lives of moral integrity by taking their obligations seriously and engaging in
the dialectical process of formulating a conception of the good and leading a life that is
consonant with that conception. That is the sense in which liberalism is individualistic24 and
committed to individual autonomy. This commitment to autonomy—to the fundamental interest
that individuals have in choosing and acting on their own conception of the good, constrained
only by the identical interest of other members of and participants in their society—carries with
it a commitment to protecting each individual’s privacy and (within limits) each individual’s

24

Contrary to the claims made by many feminist, communitarian, and critical-legal-studies legal scholars,
liberalism (or at least the kind of liberalism to which I think our society is committed) does not deny the social
embeddedness of human experience and choice or the importance of intimate relationships to human flourishing or
to individuals’ fulfilling their potential to lead lives of moral integrity. Far from viewing society as consisting of a
collection of atomized, separate individuals whose identities are not socially conditioned, the type of liberalism to
which I think our culture is committed recognizes that intimate relationships play an important role in individuals’
developing self-respect and a conception of the good and provide the context in which individuals can fulfill their
obligations and conform their lives to their personal ultimate values. For some examples from the legal literature
that contain or report the indicated feminist, communitarian, and critical-legal-studies criticism of liberalism, see
Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COL. L. REV. 304, 326
(1995); Martha Minow, Part of the Solution, Part of the Problem, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 981, 992-98 (1887);
Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 964-65 (1982); Mark Tushnet, Following the
Rules Laid Down, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 783 (1983); and ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 211
(1975).
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“ownership” of his body, freedom of choice, and ownership of the product of his labor and
savings.
Liberals are committed to protecting privacy both because doing so reinforces the
individual’s sense of his self-worth (of his being the type of creature that can make up its own
mind about the good) and because—more concretely—privacy protects an individual’s
anonymity, secrecy, and solitude in ways that promote his ability to lead a life of moral integrity
by facilitating his participation in intimate relationships (which often lead to self-discovery and
provide a context in which he can fulfill his obligations and actualize his conception of the
good), by providing him with the opportunity to contemplate the moral alternatives available to
him, and by reducing the social cost to him of experimenting with different life-styles and valuechoices.25 Liberals are committed to offering the moral-rights holders for whom they are
responsible considerable protection not just for their physical bodies but also for their freedom of
choice and the fruits of their labor and savings26 because the provision of such protection fosters
the kind of self-conception that encourages people to take responsibility for the moral quality of
their lives.
Obviously, there is no mechanical way to derive the implications of the preceding
analysis for the identity of the concrete “self-conception-related interests” that a liberal society is
obligated to secure and may choose to secure inter alia by creating a common law of torts that
imposes compensation-duties on injurers whose choices have disserved the relevant type of selfconception-related interest or, more generally, “opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity”related interest of the population as a whole. But the contestability of whether a particular loss
falls within the category of interest that is specially protected does not imply the vacuousness of
this third tort-law-related corollary of liberalism. I believe that this liberal concern that people
consider themselves to be the authors of their own lives grounds a good deal of our moral-rightsrelated law—e.g., accounts for the institution of property rights, the Constitutional prohibition of
government’s taking property except for very special purposes and even then only with just
compensation, the fact that (except in very unusual circumstances) a private actor who stands

25

I have derived this analysis from Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L. J. 421 (1980).
I hasten to add that the level of this type of protection that liberalism warrants is significantly lower than
the level that libertarians claim is each individual’s due.

26
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ready to compensate a property-owner ex post may not seize that party’s property even when the
resource-transfer in question would increase total utility or allocative efficiency,27 and the
plethora of no-duty holdings in our common law of torts.28
In order to make the examples I used to illustrate the concrete implications of the second
tort-related corollary of liberalism appropriate to the analysis of the concrete implications of this
third tort-related corollary of liberalism, I would have to change those examples solely by
assuming that—rather than creating a risk that one or more individuals would be killed, suffer
critical damage to his neurological system, or be subject to life-dominating pain—the choices in
question create a risk that one or more individuals would suffer lesser losses whose nonconsensual infliction would disfavor not only the potential and actual victims’ taking their lives
morally seriously but all members of and participants’ in our society doing so by undercutting
their belief that they are in control of their own lives, at least if the law does not obligate such
injurers to compensate them for these losses ex post.
The basic implications of liberalism for the wrongfulness of choices that create a risk of
these lesser kinds of losses are the same as their counterparts for choices that create risks of the
more serious kind of loss with which the second tort-related corollary of liberalism was
concerned: choosers who created this lesser kind of risk behaved wrongfully unless—after doing
appropriate research—they concluded that their choice would not disserve the interest of the
relevant population in having an opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity. Moreover, when
the conduct in question creates this type of self-conception risk, liberalism may have two further
implications, which reflect the fact that liberalism would not condemn individuals’ consenting to
this kind of risk:
(1)

even if it would not be wrongful for an actor to create this lesser kind of risk
without obtaining the consent of his potential victims if he could not do so either
at all or without generating allocative costs or private costs with behavioral
consequences that made the relevant effort counterproductive from the
perspective of the “goal” of giving people the opportunity to lead a life of moral

27

In my judgment, the reason for this prohibition is not the allocative efficiency of requiring propertytransfers to be effectuated through voluntary market transactions. For a discussion that bears on the exceptional
circumstances in which such property seizures are morally permissible, see the analysis on the liberal “duty to
rescue” in subsection (F) below.
28
As I will admit when discussing the sixth, duty-to-rescue-related corollary of liberalism, from a liberal
perspective, our positive tort law almost certainly errs on the side of finding no duty, though changes in what liberals
would regard to be the right direction are clearly taking place.
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integrity, it would be wrongful for the actor to impose such a risk nonconsensually when he could promote the above goal by securing his potential
victims’ consent and
(2)

even under conditions in which liberalism would not impose a duty on such a
risk-creator to obtain the ex ante consent of his potential victims, liberalism might
impose a duty on them to compensate their victims ex post and hence on the
government of a liberal, rights-based State to require such risk-creators to
compensate their victims ex post.

I hasten to add that both these additional implications are problematic. To see why, note that
they imply that it would be wrongful for an actor not to obtain his potential victim’s consent to or
not to compensate his actual victim for a loss that might be or was generated by the actor’s nonwrongful choice when the relevant payment would significantly counter the tendency of the loss
to militate against the (potential) loser’s taking his life morally seriously by altering his selfconception by making him feel that he is not the author of his own life. For this conclusion to be
consistent with my other conclusions about the tort-related implications of liberalism, it must be
possible to reconcile it with my conclusions about the duty of members of and participants in a
liberal, rights-based society to supply help or rescue-services to others (indeed, to supply them
without having a right to compensation for costs incurred), and I do not see how I can effect this
reconciliation, given my conclusion that the risk-creator did not act wrongfully in creating the
relevant risk (was not morally culpable for his victim’s requiring assistance).
One final point should be made about this third tort-related corollary of liberalism. Like
its predecessors, it does not imply that the members of and participants in a liberal, rights-based
society will be obligated to avoid creating these kinds of risks if and only if they should have
perceived their rejection of some related risk-reducing choice to be allocatively inefficient.
(D)

The Fourth, Mere-Utility-Related Monetized-Tort-Duty Corollary of Liberalism
This corollary has a limited domain—i.e., applies only in relation to avoidance-choices

whose rejection would not preclude its victims from leading lives of moral integrity (see
corollary two) and would also not militate against their leading such lives by undermining their
conception of themselves as moral agents (the possibility with which the third corollary is
concerned). The monetized-tort-duty corollary is that, when acting in non-political capacities
and considering avoidance-options whose rejection will not preclude or militate against its
Articles/09_27_2004_Liberalism_and_Tort_Law

34

victims’ leading lives of moral integrity in ways other than by reducing the general resources at
their disposal, each morally-responsible member of a liberal, rights-based society has a moral
duty to make all avoidance-moves that he would conclude would reduce the net certaintyequivalent equivalent-dollar losses he imposed on others (if he did the morally-appropriate
amount of research into this issue) that he would find attractive to make if the reduction in such
net certainty-equivalent equivalent-dollar losses that the relevant avoidance-move would
generate were internalized to him.
This monetized-tort-duty corollary reflects two premises. The first is that the liberal duty
of appropriate, equal respect and concern implies that any choice of a moral agent that he
realizes or should realize will inflict “net harm” on others without preventing them from leading
lives of moral integrity or militating against their leading such lives by undermining their belief
that they are the authors of their lives violates his duty of appropriate, equal respect and concern
if his decision to make that choice was critically influenced by his placing a lower weight on the
“units of harm” he inflicted on others than he would have done had he experienced that harm
himself. The second premise—liberal dualism—is relevant to the way in which the relevant
“units of harm to others” and “units of benefits to oneself” should be defined. As I have already
indicated, the variant of liberal dualism I am employing asserts that, when acting in their nonpolitical capacities, the individual participants in a liberal State do not have a duty to adjust their
behavior to take account of variations in the extent to which additional undifferentiated resources
would contribute to the mere-utility-type welfare of others or the opportunity of others to lead
lives of moral integrity when the putative obligor is not morally responsible for (in the sense of
being culpable for) the putative obligee’s poverty or other attributes (e.g., physical or mental
handicaps, poor education, disposition to take pleasure from material resources, etc.) that affect
the contribution that additional resources will make to the putative obligee’s mere utility or
ability to lead a life of moral integrity. I believe that, in the sense in which I am using this
concept, liberal dualism implies that the obligations of individuals who are acting in non-political
capacities when making private choices that will tend to affect the certainty-equivalent accidentor-pollution losses others confront depend on those choices’ equivalent-dollar effects.
Two additional points are relevant at this juncture. First (roughly speaking), the fourth
postulate is consistent with our practice of using a Hand-type formula for negligence to

Articles/09_27_2004_Liberalism_and_Tort_Law

35

determine the culpability of an actor in that this formula does base fault-conclusions on a
comparison of monetized costs and benefits.29 Second, the fourth, monetized-tort-duty corollary
focuses on certainty-equivalent (i.e., risk-cost adjusted) equivalent-dollar gains and losses while
its two predecessors focused on weighted-average effects because both mere-utility-related risk
costs and life-of-moral-integrity-related risk costs involve the kinds of mere-utility losses that
play no role when the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity is implicated but are relevant
when “mere-utility” losses are at stake.
I want to reiterate something to which the Introduction already referred. This explanation
of the connection between a cleaned-up version of the Hand formula for negligence and the
liberal duty of appropriate, equal respect provides a moral grounding for using the Hand formula
to determine an injurer’s liability in some types of tort cases—viz., in cases in which his behavior
generated “mere utility” losses that he should have anticipated ex ante. I value this fact not only
because it improves the fit between our positive tort law and my claim that ours is a liberal,
rights-based society but also because the existing alleged normative justifications for the Hand
formula are thoroughly unsatisfactory:

(E)

(1)

allocative efficiency is not a goal in itself and (as we shall see) the Hand formula
is not allocatively efficient in any event and

(2)

utilitarianism is highly problematic as a moral norm (both because it fails to take
relevant differences between individuals seriously and because it may not be
possible to measure all experiential effects by a single metric), and there is
certainly no reason to believe that the Hand formula will maximize the utility of
those creatures whose utility utilitarianism counts.30

The Fifth, “Research”-Related Pair of Tort-Related Corollaries of Liberalism

29

Admittedly, to be fully consistent with the variant of liberal dualism I believe is warranted, the Hand
formula would have to be adjusted both (1) to reflect the risk-cost consequences of the relevant avoidance-move
rejection and (2) to focus on the estimates that the relevant actor should have made of his rejected avoidance-move
rejection’s allocative rather than private costs and benefits. For an analysis of the difficulty and occasional
impossibility of adjusting the Hand formula to take the impact of avoidance-moves on tort-related risk costs into
account in a way that would yield a formula whose application would maximize allocative efficiency in an
otherwise-Pareto-perfect world, see Richard S. Markovits, Tort-Related Risk Costs and the Hand Formula for
Negligence (unpublished manuscript currently under submission and available from the author, 2004).
30
Nor do I think that one can justify making tort decisions depend exclusively on their allocative efficiency
by claiming that such a policy would be part of a broader policy-package that would maximize total utility. See
Richard S. Markovits, Why Kaplow and Shavell’s “Double-Distortion Argument” Argument Is Wrong, ___ GEO.
MASON L. REV.___ (2004).
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The word “research” is enquoted in the above heading because in this context I am
defining “research” expansively not only to refer to “efforts to discover (1) new, safer (i.e., lessaccident-and-pollution-loss-prone) production-techniques, (2) locations whose advantages and
disadvantages for the relevant use were not previously known but whose use will be lessaccident-and-pollution-cost-prone, and (3) not-yet-discovered product variants whose production
and consumption combined would be less-accident-and-pollution-loss-prone but also to refer to
the non-innovative efforts of a potential tort-loss cogenerator to identify (4) the avoidance-moves
known to others that are available to him and to ascertain (5) the known private and perhaps
allocative cost and benefits they would generate. Not surprisingly, in my judgment, the corollary
of liberalism that controls the research obligations of a potential injurer in a liberal, rights-based
society depends on the type of loss his research might put him in a position to avoid by using any
new discovery it yields or any known information it uncovers for him. If this loss is a mereutility loss (with one qualification that will be discussed below), his “research”-obligation will be
governed by the monetized tort-duty the fourth corollary of liberalism articulates—i.e., he will be
obligated to do the research that would have been profitable for him to do if the equivalent-dollar
benefits the use of any discovery it generates or “known” information it reveals to him would
confer on others were internalized to him (if he placed the same weight on the average
equivalent-dollar gain the research and its use would confer on others as on the average
equivalent-dollar it would cost him). If, on the other hand, the loss that the potential injurer
might be able to prevent himself from causing by doing “research” and using the “research
output” is the kind of loss that would preclude the victim from leading a life of moral integrity or
change his (and perhaps others’) self-conception in a way that would militate against the victim’s
(or each of the relevant others’) taking his life morally seriously, the potential injurer will be
obligated to do the research he should have known ex ante would prevent the combination of his
research and the activity to which it related from reducing the ex ante weighted-average number
of days of moral integrity that relevant individuals have the opportunity to live if he and others
made appropriate use of the discovery it yielded or information it brought to his attention.
I want to make four points about these tort-related “research” corollaries of liberalism.
First, the second “research” corollary reflects my conclusion that potential injurers do not have
an obligation to ensure that their activities make any much less the largest possible contribution
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to the number of days of moral integrity that relevant individuals have the opportunity to live.
This conclusion reflects my suspicion that its opposite would militate against individuals’ seizing
the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity by undermining their belief that they are the
authors of their own lives—a suspicion that (as we have seen) underlies the third corollary of
liberalism just discussed and will also affect my conclusions about the duty of members of and
participants in a liberal, rights-based society to provide rescue-services to each other (the subject
of the sixth set of tort-related corollaries of liberalism, which will be discussed below).
Second, even if this moral conclusion were not true, potential injurers whose activities
made a net positive contribution to relevant individuals’ having the opportunity to live days of
moral integrity would not have to research themselves into the red or into bankruptcy: even if the
research in question would otherwise increase the opportunity to live days of moral integrity, it
would not serve this basic liberal “goal” if it induced the researcher to withdraw from an activity
whose net effect on the opportunity to live days of moral integrity was not negative.
Third, neither of the two “research” obligations I have described requires the potential
injurer to become perfectly informed—to discover all previously-unknown, “desirable”
avoidance-options or to uncover all known avoidance-options and their known consequences.
Potential injurers who have fulfilled their “research” obligations will usually still be imperfectly
informed about the known avoidance-options that are available to them, about those options’
private and allocative costs and benefits, about the identity of the conventional research-projects
they could execute, about the private and allocative costs and benefits of those projects, and
about their opportunity-to-lead-a-life-of-moral-integrity-related costs and benefits.
The qualifications to which my initial account of the “research” obligations of potential
injurers referred relates to this reality. The initial account assumed that the potential injurer
would be perfectly informed about not only the private but also the allocative costs and benefits
of the various “research” projects he could execute. That assumption is unrealistic. In a world in
which perfect information about “research”-options is not costlessly available to potential
injurers, their “research” obligations (1) will include an obligation to do appropriate research into
the identity and allocative or opportunity-to-lead-a-life-of-moral-integrity-related cost and
benefits of the research-projects they could undertake and (2) to execute the research projects
that the standard would require them to execute if their perception of the relevant costs and
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benefits of their research-options were accurate. Obviously potential injurers whose choices may
generate mere-utility losses who did not recognize the conceptual difference between the
relevant allocative figures and their private counterparts or did not know how to estimate the
relevant allocative parameters—e.g., to move from private-figure estimates to allocative-figure
estimates—will have based their decisions on private cost and benefit estimates. And potential
injurers whose choices may reduce the number of days of lives of moral integrity some victims
can lead who did not recognize the difference between an opportunity-to-lead-a-life-of-moralintegrity metric and an allocative-efficiency metric, will have based their decisions on private or
allocative equivalent-dollar-impact estimates rather than on opportunity-to-lead-a-life-of-moralintegrity-impact estimates.
Fourth, finally, and somewhat relatedly, my discussion of the “research” obligations of
participants in a liberal, rights-based State has ignored a serious, infinite-regress problem. In
order to determine how much “research” he should do, a potential injurer must think about the
allocative or opportunity-to-lead-a-life-of-moral-integrity-related costs and benefits of doing
research. The problem is: he might also be obligated to consider how much he should think
about the respective costs and benefits of thinking about the respective costs and benefits of
doing the research and so on and so forth. My unsatisfactory response to this problem is to cut
the Gordian Knot—i.e., to assume that the potential researcher will and should just jump in and
think about the relevant options and their relevant costs and benefits.
(F)

The Sixth, Duty-to-Rescue-Oriented Corollary of Liberalism
The sixth tort-related corollary of liberalism I distinguish summarizes liberalism’s

implications for the duty to rescue. I will first discuss what I take to be the basic liberal duty to
rescue and then discuss a qualification to that basic duty that may provide a liberal justification
for our society’s failure to impose a legal duty to rescue in some situations in which one might
think that liberalism would impose such a duty.31

31

In general, our society—indeed, all societies in the common-law family—imposes legal duties to rescue in
far fewer situations than liberalism would require. It should be noted, however, that in recent years, legal duties to
provide assistance have been imposed on several additional categories of potential “rescuers”—e.g., on store-owners
to non-customer companions of customers on their premises and on landowners to uninvited companions of their
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Two initial points should be made about the basic liberal duty to rescue or provide
assistance. First, this basic duty arises only when there is some chance that the potential rescuee
will otherwise suffer a loss that would eliminate his opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity
(say, by killing him) or possibly that would militate against his seizing his opportunity to lead
such a life by undermining his belief that he is the author of his own life—at least when the loss
in question will not produce such effects solely by reducing the victim’s material resources
below the level required to survive or to have a meaningful opportunity to lead a life of moral
integrity in the society in question. Second, the basic liberal duty to rescue or provide assistance
is an accommodation of two corollaries of liberalism that have already been articulated that have
conflicting implications for the duty in question. In the one direction, liberalism’s commitment
to valuing individuals’ having the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity implies that,
ceteris paribus, members of and participants in a liberal, rights-based society have a duty to
prevent co-members and co-participants from suffering losses that would preclude them from
leading such lives and to prevent preventable losses whose non-prevention manifests a kind of
disrespect for the victim that is bad in itself and also bad because it alters the victim’s (and
perhaps various observers’) self-conception in a way that militates against his (their) taking his
life (their lives) morally seriously. In the other direction, the liberal commitment to valuing
individuals’ not only having but also seizing the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity
implies that, ceteris paribus, obligations should not be imposed on individuals that would
militate against their taking their own lives morally seriously either by creating a risk that they
will be damaged in a way that will preclude them from leading a life of moral integrity or by
causing them to feel that their life is not their own—i.e., by militating against their leading a life
of moral integrity by undermining their belief in their control over their own lives and
derivatively in their moral agency. My tentative conclusion is that, from the perspective of
liberalism, the following basic duty to rescue (which I believe resembles the moral duty many
members of our society believe we all have) would represent the proper accommodation of these
two corollaries of liberalism: members of and participants in liberal, rights-based societies are
morally obligated to take those steps they can take to prevent other members of and participants
invitees. See William Powers, Book Review of MARSHALL SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT-LAW, POWER, AND PUBLIC
POLICY, 57 TEX. L. REV. 523 (!979).
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in the society in question (including those to whom they have made no relevant promise, those
with whom they have no relevant status relationship, and those whose need for help they did not
culpably create) from suffering a loss that would preclude them from or strongly militate against
their living a life of moral integrity that they can take without (1) incurring a significant risk of
substantial bodily injury or death or (2) devoting an exorbitant amount of time to the rescue
effort.
The second duty-to-rescue-related corollary of liberalism—which I call “the nonuniqueness qualification”—qualifies the basic duty to rescue. According to this qualification, a
potential rescuer whom liberalism would otherwise obligate to provide assistance to someone in
need will not have this duty if he is not the best-placed potential rescuer or perhaps, even more
comprehensively, if one or more other moral agents are in a position to provide assistance that
liberalism would obligate one or more such others to provide if the other in question were the
only potential rescuer who could prevent a kind of loss whose possible occurrence can trigger a
liberal duty to rescue without incurring a significant risk of substantial bodily harm or death and
without devoting a prohibitive amount of time to the rescue.
I can offer three far-from-satisfactory justifications for or accounts of this non-uniqueness
qualification—i.e., for the conclusion that an actor who is not uniquely-well-placed to supply
rescue services that liberalism would otherwise obligate him to supply or is not the only member
of the set of potential rescuers who would individually be obligated to attempt the rescue if the
relevant set included only him will not have a duty to provide the help in question. The first
possible justification is convincing when it applies but does not apply to many of the relevant
situations. If an individual who would be obligated to effectuate a rescue if he were the only
member of the set of potential rescuers for whom that assertion was true reasonably believed that
someone else equally capable of effectuating the rescue would definitely attempt to do so if he
did not or, more comprehensively, if he reasonably believed that his attempt to effectuate the
rescue would not increase the probability that the rescuee would be saved, he would not be
obligated to make the relevant rescue-attempt (he would not be at fault for failing to make that
attempt).
The next two “justifications” for the non-uniqueness qualification to the basic liberal duty
to rescue are problematic even when they do apply. Both fall into the category that philosophers
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call “practical reasons.” The first is that a decision to hold liable each potential rescuer whom
liberalism would obligate to attempt a rescue if he were the only potential rescuer may produce
inferior outcomes from both a rights-related interest and mere-utility perspective by making it
less likely that the potential rescuer who was best-placed to attempt the rescue from a liberal
perspective would actually attempt the rescue. Normative/conceptual objections aside, this
argument is vulnerable to empirical attack: to objections that focus on the realisticness of its
possible implicit assumptions that the potential rescuers will themselves know the identity of the
best-placed potential rescuer ex ante and that the courts will be able to identify this best-placed
potential rescuer ex post.
The third possible justification for the non-uniqueness qualification of the basic liberal
duty to rescue is prudential in a sense that I have argued elsewhere

32

renders its consideration

morally illegitimate—i.e., inconsistent with our society’s moral commitments. A decision not to
hold liable each non-unique, otherwise-culpable potential rescuer in this type of case may be
morally attractive (even if it does not induce the government or any other non-governmental
entity to supply equally-desirable or more desirable rescue-attempts) because it reduces the
likelihood that the government will impose liability on a particular non-unique, non-performing
potential rescuer (rather than on another non-unique, non-performing potential rescuer or on no
potential rescuer) for illicit reasons—e.g., because of the political opposition, race, ethnicity, etc.
of the potential rescuer who was singled out.
Two related issues remain to be discussed: When, if ever, does liberalism imply that
someone who has attempted a rescue he was obligated to attempt has a moral right to be
compensated for his efforts, and if liberalism does imply that a rescue-attempter is entitled to
compensation, by what standard should his compensation be determined? It seems clear to me
that liberalism implies that a potential rescuee who was culpable for his imperilment (partly
because of the burden his danger-creating choices imposed on his potential rescuers) is obligated
to compensate anyone who reasonably attempted to rescue him for the “full” cost the rescueattempter reasonably incurred to attempt the rescue and collect compensation. Note that I did not
say that the potential rescuee had an obligation to pay the rescue-attempter a supra32

See RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, MATTERS
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 60-64 (1998).

OF
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AND

compensatory fee or the fee that would be most-allocatively-efficient,33 given its impact on the
number of individuals who put themselves in a position to make a rescue-attempt, the number of
such individuals who attempt given rescues, the nature of the rescue-attempts that are executed,
the choices that potential rescuees make to avoid becoming imperiled, and the decisions that
potential rescuees make about whether to accept or reject offers of rescue as well as the myriad
of Pareto imperfections that cause the private costs and benefits of these interconnected sets of
choices to diverge from their allocative counterparts. It also seems clear to me that liberalism
implies that the formula for the rescue-attempter’s compensation should include (1) the private
opportunity cost to him of devoting time to the rescue-attempt, (2) (on some definitions,
redundantly) the “unpleasantness” cost of attempting the rescue as opposed to spending time in
some experientially-neutral way (in some way that was neither enjoyable nor unpleasant), (3) the
risk costs he incurred to make the rescue-attempt, given the possibility that he might not be
compensated for the full private cost of his efforts, (4) the private transaction costs he reasonably
incurred to secure his compensation, and (5) the risk costs he incurred because it was not certain
that he would be fully reimbursed for these transaction costs. I am uncertain whether liberalism
implies that a potential rescuer’s award should be reduced by the intrinsic equivalent-dollar value
to him of having attempted and perhaps succeeded in effectuating the rescue.
I am also not sure about the implications of liberalism for the compensation duties of a
potential rescuee who became imperiled through no fault of his own. I am inclined to say that
such a potential rescuee is not obligated to compensate his rescue-attempter, though as a policy
matter this conclusion is disfavored by its tendency to reduce the number of desirable rescueattempts that are actually made as well as the number of people who desirably put themselves in
a position to make such desirable rescue-attempts (given the probability that informationimperfections and transaction costs with different origins will preclude the State from securing
desirable rescue-attempts and desirable investments in rescue-capacity by threatening to fine or
prosecute those who fail to make them or promising to compensate those who do make them).

33

For an exhaustive and exhausting treatment of this issue, see Richard S. Markovits, Marine-Salvage Law:
A Third-Best-Economic-Efficiency Analysis (unpublished book manuscript available from the author, 2004). For a
somewhat less exhaustive and exhausting treatment of this issue, see Marine-Salvage Law and Marine-Salvage
Policy: A Second-Best and Third-Best Allocative-Efficiency Analysis (unpublished Article manuscript under
submission available from the author, 2005).

Articles/09_27_2004_Liberalism_and_Tort_Law

43

Perhaps the proper response to this problem would be for the State as opposed to the imperiled
party to reward people who attempt rescues of imperiled individuals who were innocent of their
predicament.
(G)

The Seventh, Duty-of-Repair Tort-Related Corollary of Liberalism
The seventh tort-related corollary of liberalism is that individuals who have committed

tortious wrongful acts that have harmed a moral-rights holder have (1) a duty to mitigate the
harm they have caused—in particular, by making harm-mitigating choices that promote life-ofmoral-integrity-related interests on balance when the harm is life-of-moral-integrity-related and
by making choices that are allocatively efficient when the harm is mere-utility-related—and (2) a
prima facie duty to compensate their victims fully for the losses they imposed on them. I want to
make six points about a tortious wrongdoer’s compensation-duty.
First, I believe that a wrongful avoidance-move rejector in a liberal, rights-based society
has a duty to compensate his potential accident-or-pollution-loss victims for the risk costs he
imposed on them by altering the probability distribution of the uncompensated accident and
pollution losses they might incur, regardless of whether the accident or pollution-event in
question actually occurs. Second, I believe that a wrongful injurer’s duty to compensate his
victims extends beyond the conventional loss his wrongful act inflicted on them (and the risk
costs the possibility of the loss’ occurring and their not being compensated for the loss imposed
on them) to include the private transaction costs they reasonably incurred to secure compensation
from him (and the risk costs associated with their not being compensated for any reasonable
transaction costs they incur to pursue their tort claim). I recognize the contestability of the
“reasonableness” of both particular expenses entitled victims incur when pursuing their claim
and the overall amount of such expenses they incur. I will not now try to develop a protocol for
determining the reasonableness of any given expenditure an entitled tort victim makes to pursue
his claim. However, I will say that, if a tortious wrongdoer has a duty to compensate his victim
for the transaction costs they incur to obtain compensation from him, the victim has a duty not to
abuse the wrongdoer by incurring “unreasonable” dispute-prosecution costs. Third, I think that,
when the wrongdoer’s tortious act was motivated by his disrespect for the victim-plaintiff in
particular, the victim should be able to collect damages for the insult the wrongdoer’s tortious act
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entailed as well as for any material losses, physical injuries, physical-injury-related pain and
suffering, reasonable dispute-prosecuting transaction costs, and loss-and-transaction-cost-related
risk costs it caused the victim to incur.
Fourth, in a liberal, rights-based society, the victim of a tortious act may well have a
moral right that enough costs be inflicted on his wrongdoer to prevent the wrongdoer from
profiting from his wrong. Although I realize that most corrective-justice discussions do not
address this possible “corrective-justice” interest of a wronged party, I can see at least four
grounds for concluding that a wronged victim has such an interest. First, the wronged victim
might have a property interest that was violated by the tort (say, trespass) and be entitled to the
profits the wrongdoer realized from his wrong (to the disgorgement of profits) on this account.
Second, the wronged victim might have a legitimate interest in the wrongdoer’s not profiting
from the wrongful act that was wrongful because it manifested the injurer’s particular disrespect
for his potential victim. Third, the wronged victim might have a legitimate, retributive interest in
the wrongdoer’s being punished (though this interest would favor the imposition of enough
sanctions on the wrongdoer to make his wrongful act ex post unprofitable as opposed to ex post
break-even). And fourth, a wronged victim who was not singled out for disrespect by his injurer
might have an entitlement in common with all other members of and participants in his liberal,
rights-based society that no one profit by behaving disrespectfully. I should add that, in this last
case, the particular victim would not have a right that the wrongdoer be required to pay his direct
victim enough damages to deprive him of his profits: if a liberal State has a duty to prevent
wrongdoers from profiting from their wrongs in these cases, it can discharge that duty by
requiring wrongdoers to pay civil or criminal fines or to put in jail-time in addition to
compensating their victims when such compensation would not eliminate the profits their
wrongdoing yielded.34 Not only would such alternative methods of preventing wrongdoers from
34

I am therefore partially disagreeing with Ernest Weinrib’s “correlativity thesis.” On the one hand, I agree
with Weinrib that a tortious wrongdoer’s liability to his traditional victims is limited to the loss he imposed on them
(at least if that loss is defined to include the risk costs, reasonable transaction costs, and insult costs the wrong
imposed on them or caused them to incur) even when the wrong would remain profitable after these losses were
repaired. On the other, I believe that a liberal, rights-based State may have a duty to supplement such compensatory
damage-awards with enough civil fines and criminal penalties to render the tortious wrongdoer’s wrongdoing
unprofitable. See Ernest Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW
1 (1999). Admittedly, as I have already indicated, at least when the wrongdoer’s wrong was not motivated (in
whole or in part) by his particular disrespect for his actual victim(s), those victims would not have a special
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profiting from their wrongs prevent their victims from obtaining windfall gains, they would also
tend to increase allocative efficiency
(1)

by eliminating the incentive supra-compensatory damages would give potential
victims to decrease allocative efficiency by putting themselves in harm’s way by
rejecting avoidance-moves whose rejection is either not assessed for contributory
negligence or would sometimes mistakenly be found not to be contributorily
negligent and

(2)

by providing revenue to the government and thereby obviating its raising the
funds in question in alternative ways that would decrease allocative efficiency.

The positive law on these issues is complicated.

Punitive damages seem to be

discretionary and are not available in all cases in which the wrongdoer would profit from his
wrong if required to do no more than compensate his victims fully for their loss. Instead,
punitive damages tend to be deemed appropriate when the injurer has behaved in a way that is
worse than merely negligent—has been grossly negligent, has intentionally committed a
wrongful act, or has actively desired to inflict the loss he generated on the actual victim or on
someone. When the tort has violated a property right of its victim, the victim is held to be
entitled to choose between a tort action in which he would be entitled to damages and an action
in restitution in which he would be entitled to recover the “profits” the wrong generated for the
wrongdoer (to disgorgement). The word “profits” is enquoted in the previous sentence because
it is sometimes measured by the savings the wrongdoer secured by not paying the victim for the
right to use his property or paying someone else for equivalent property and is sometimes
measured by a higher sum equal to the profits the wrongdoer achieved by using the victim’s
property rather than doing without it or any equivalent to it. In practice, courts tend to award the
higher sum when the wrongdoer behaved more wrongfully (e.g., committed the wrong
intentionally rather than carelessly).
The fit between the positive law and the various possible bases for concluding that
victims have a right that their wrongful injurers not profit their wrongs is also difficult to assess.
The fact that property-right holders are entitled to prevent their injurers from profiting from their

entitlement to the State’s fulfilling this duty. Although it seems to me that wrongdoers have a moral duty to
surrender the profits they earned from wrongdoing to the State, they clearly would not have such a duty if their
making the relevant admission or payment might make them vulnerable to criminal prosecution.
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wrongs and to require wrongful injurers who have behaved really badly to pay them an amount
that would make the wrong ex post unprofitable, legal-transaction-cost consequences aside, is
consistent with the property-based account of this victim right (and with the liberal [and
libertarian] accounts of the importance of property rights). The fact that no legal right to
punitive damages or profit-disgorgement is recognized in cases of ordinary negligence when the
invalid interest is not a property interest may in part reflect an assessment of the insultingness of
ordinary negligence and in part a recognition that luck plays a substantial role in determining
whether a given negligent choice causes a loss as well as the magnitude of a loss it generates.35
Fifth, I want to raise the possibility that—in a liberal, rights-based society—a tortious
wrongdoer’s moral duty to compensate his victims may be somewhat pro-active (may extend
beyond a duty to respond appropriately to justified demands for compensation from his wronged
victims to include a duty to incur a reasonable amount of expenses to identify and compensate
his victims). Sixth, I want to point out that, although a tortious wrongdoer’s duty to compensate
his victims is diminished or extinguished by his victim’s securing partial or total compensation
from another source other than the wrongdoer’s own insurance-company (say, the victim’s
private tort-loss insurer or the government), such cross-payments do not extinguish but merely
transfer the wrongdoer’s duty to pay from a duty to pay his victims to a duty to pay his victim’s
payor.
(2)

The Tort-Related Obligations of a Liberal, Rights-Based State

(A)

The General Tort-Related Obligations of the Governments of a Liberal, Rights-Based
State
A rights-based State of moral integrity has a general duty to maximize the extent to

which the rights-related interests of those for whom it is responsible are secured and has a related
prima facie duty to minimize the damage to rights-related interests that is done by tortious acts.
This duty is prima facie because it does not require a liberal, rights-based State to secure this
result when doing so would necessitate its sacrificing weightier rights-related interests. I do not
35

Some canonical cases in this area are Beck v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1018 (10th Cir. 1999)
and Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946). See also Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleishmann Distilling
Corp., 309 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1968); John P. Dawson, Restitution Without Enrichment, 61 B.U. L. REV. 513 (1981);
and GEORGE E. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION §2.12 at 158, 164-66 (1978).
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think that this last qualification is empirically important in the case of the contemporary United
States, but I can imagine situations in which general social poverty put a government of a liberal,
rights-based State in a position in which it could not protect the tort-related moral interests of its
subjects without generating allocative transaction costs and productivity disincentives that would
prevent it from providing its subjects with a sufficient amount of the money, specific goods and
services, and specific opportunities that would significantly contribute to their having the
opportunity to lead lives of moral integrity for the effort to protect tort-rights to reduce the
protection given to moral-rights-related interests on balance.
A society’s government can fulfill its duty to minimize the damage that wrongful acts
(and in some causation-situations acts that may not be wrongful36) do to the tort-related moralrights-related interests of those for whom it is responsible in a wide variety of ways: by
educating its subjects to render them more likely to fulfill their liberal duty of appropriate, equal
respect and concern when considering possibly-tortious choices, by imposing civil fines or
criminal penalties on tortious wrongdoers, and/or by giving tort victims a legal entitlement to
obtain compensation from their wrongful injurers and enabling them to take advantage of this
entitlement (by giving them easy and inexpensive access to justice, by supplying them directly
with the information they require to win their cases, and/or by offering rewards to non-victim
informants who provide relevant information), etc. Whether liberal, rights-based States have a
moral duty to make wrongful injurers pay enough damages, civil fines, and criminal penalties
(including jail-time) to prevent them from profiting from their wrongdoing depends in part on
whether such a policy is an essential part of any morally-requisite tort-deterrence scheme and in

36

I have in mind step-function damage situations in which a set of avoidance-move rejections none of which
is wrongful collectively reduce allocative efficiency or disserve the interest of relevant individuals in having an
opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity. Assume a case in which the relevant loss is a “mere utility” loss, that no
such loss will be generated if 0 to 49.99 units of pollution are put into the atmosphere, that $100 in pollution losses
will be generated if 50 to 99.99 units of pollution are put into the atmosphere, and that in the original situation, 30
polluters know that each is putting 2 units of pollution into the atmosphere that he could have avoided emitting at a
cost of $2. In this situation, allocative efficiency could be increased by $88 if six of the thirty polluters avoided
though no individual polluter originally made an allocatively-inefficient and hence wrongful choice: at least if as
seems probable, no individual could induce others to follow his example, each would assume that his avoidance
would cost him $2 and effect no change in the pollution loss generated. My inclination is to conclude that, in this
situation, unless the government would have to generate at least $88 in allocative transaction costs and other types of
public-finance-related allocative “costs” to induce six of the polluters to avoid completely (or enough polluters to
avoid to a lesser extent to reduce the number of units of pollution from 60 to 49.99 or fewer), it would be obligated
to do so.
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part on whether one concludes that actual tort victims (or the members of the society in general)
have a moral right that tortfeasors be prevented from profiting from their tortious wrongs. As
already indicated, if a liberal, rights-based State has a duty to prevent wrongdoers from profiting
from their wrongs, that duty does not imply that any wrongdoer’s victims are morally entitled to
have him pay them sufficient damages to render his wrongdoing unprofitable.
A summary may be useful. I have just argued that the government(s) of liberal, rightsbased societies have important tort-related duties. However, at least if I am correct in concluding
that the members of such a society do not have a moral right to receive compensation from their
wrongdoer if the government insures them against tort-losses, such a society is not obligated to
create a corrective-justice-oriented law of torts, either legislatively or by creating common-law
courts and authorizing their judges to make binary decisions that secure the relevant correctivejustice-related interests of the parties before them and the rights-related interests of various
others affected by the relevant legal outcomes. However, one way that liberal, rights-based
States can discharge part of their tort-related duties is to create and operate such common-law
courts.
(B)

The Obligations of Adjudicators of Common-Law Tort Disputes in a Liberal, RightsBased State
Part 2 will be concerned with the moral legitimacy of judges’ resolving common-law tort

cases in the way that is allocatively efficient when this resolution cannot be justified in
corrective-justice terms. To prepare the way for this discussion, I want to explain why it is
morally impermissible in a liberal, rights-based State (i.e., inconsistent with such a State’s moralrights commitments) for judges to make decisions in common-law cases that cannot be justified
in liberal-corrective-justice terms. Four points are salient. First, the fact that the cases in
question are common-law cases implies that their internally-right resolution cannot be derived
from (1) legislation passed by official State legislative decisionmakers or (2) constitutional texts
that do something other than articulate the moral rights of those for whom the relevant State is
responsible and the moral duties that the relevant State has in relation to those rights. Second,
the preceding point implies that any attempt by a common-law judge to resolve a common-law
(tort) case in other than corrective-justice terms would amount to an exercise of legislative power
by that judge. Third, since the resolution of a common-law case in favor of a plaintiff that is not
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based on the plaintiff’s pre-existing corrective-justice rights imposes a legal duty on the
defendant that he did not have at the time he rejected the choice the court says he is legally
obligated to have made, it seems accurate to conclude that defendants in such cases have been
subjected to ex post facto legislation. Fourth, ex post facto legislation violates the liberal duty of
appropriate, equal respect and concern for at least four somewhat-overlapping reasons:
(1)

because ex post facto legislation is unauthorized, it fails to show the respect that is
due to members of the society in question by denying them the ability to be the
authors of the laws that constrain them;

(2)

it denies its victims political procedural-fairness—i.e., various opportunities they
would have to protect themselves in the normal legislative process37;

(3)

it fails to show the society’s members appropriate respect and concern by denying
its victims fair notice; and

(4)

it fails to show the society’s members appropriate, equal respect and concern by
facilitating the government’s punishing its political opponents and disadvantaging
the targets of the prejudices of government officials and/or their constituents (by
reducing the extent to which the government is inhibited from imposing losses on
particular individuals by the facts that legislative decisions have more widespread
applicability and are more difficult to reverse than judicial decisions).

Fifth, if I am correct that the moral principles on which a rights-based State is committed to
grounding its moral-rights discourse and conduct are inside its common law, judges who resolve
common-law cases by reference to those principles (and the corrective-justice notions they
entail) will be finding the law and not promulgating new legislation (even when their conclusions
are novel and their reasoning innovative in that they reflect insights into the concrete
implications of our society’s moral commitments and/or refinements in the conceptualization of
those commitments that no other judge, legal scholar, or legal or philosophical commentator
respectively had or made), those who are disadvantaged by correct common-law decisions will
37

I admit that this objection may be unjustified for both conceptual and empirical reasons. The conceptual
problem relates to the difficulty of providing a coherent or persuasive concretization of the political-participation or
political-outcome rights of the members of a liberal, rights-based State (beyond the right of such individuals to have
the State act to protect the non-political-rights rights-related interests of those for whom it is responsible). For a
discussion of this difficulty, see Daniel S. Markovits, Democratic Disobedience, ___ YALE L.J. ___ (2005)
(forthcoming). For the possibility that the relevant concern is unjustified for empirical reasons (that the access and
influence imperfections that would be connected with such judicial legislation would offset the access and influence
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not be victims of ex post facto legislation, both sides of a common-law dispute will have fair
notice of the terms on which it will be decided (since members of and participants in a rightsbases society are responsible for knowing both the abstract moral principles to which
membership or participation in that society commits them and the concrete corollaries of those
principles), and the probability that government will use the common-law courts to punish its
opponents and disadvantage the targets of its prejudice will be reduced (though, given the
contestability of the correct answer to many corrective-justice questions, the opportunity for
corruption will not be eliminated).
2.

The Possible Allocative (Economic) Inefficiency of the Internally-Correct Resolution of
Corrective-Justice Claims in Common-Law Tort-Suits in a Liberal, Rights-Based Society
Part 2 delineates and explores twelve reasons why the resolution of either common-law

tort-issues or common-law tort-cases that is correct as a matter of law in a liberal, rights-based
State may not be allocatively efficient even if no allocative-efficiency problems are caused by (1)
any tort doctrine not required by our liberal commitments that is not first-best-allocativelyefficient (allocatively efficient in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect world), (2) the transaction costs
that are generated by the making, defending, and processing of tort claims, or (3) any mistake of
the relevant tort cogenerators or adjudicative decisionmakers other than those this section
discusses.
A.

The Fact That the Members of and Participants in a Liberal, Rights-Based Society Have
No Duty to Make the Choices that Maximize Their Equivalent-Dollar Gains When Those
Choices Are Not Require by the Rights of Others or the Actor’s Duty to Take His Life
Morally Seriously
Liberalism’s implications for the duties that the members of and participants in a liberal,

rights-based society are complicated and contestable. This section is based on the following
tentative conclusions:
(1)

the members of and participants in a liberal, rights-based society do have a duty to
take their lives morally seriously—to lead a life of moral integrity;

imperfections associated with legislative-branch and executive-branch legislation), see LAWRENCE G. SAGER,
JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES 202-07 (2004).
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(2)

this duty grounds the duty of the governments of a liberal, rights-based State to
put these individuals in a position to lead such a life by ensuring that they have
the health care, police protection, nutrition, housing, clothing, education,
experiences, and exposure to alternative value-choices and lifestyles that will
contribute significantly to their ability to lead lives of moral integrity and by
preventing them from making choices to kill themselves (in most circumstances),
to sell themselves into slavery, or (in most circumstances) to become addicted to
some drug that will deprive them of a meaningful opportunity to lead a life of
moral integrity;38

(3)

the fact that a liberal, rights-based State’s members have a duty to lead a life of
moral integrity does not imply that the governments of a liberal, rights-based
State have a duty to induce these individuals to lead lives of moral integrity by
penalizing their failure to do so since what is valued is individuals’ freely
choosing to lead lives of moral integrity, though it may imply that the
governments of a liberal, rights-based State have a duty to explain the
attractiveness of leading lives of moral integrity; and

(4)

the individual members of and participants in a liberal, rights-based State have no
duty to maximize their equivalent-dollar interests when their failure to do so
would not violate the rights of others or their own duty to lead a life of moral
integrity.

This fourth conclusion has the following corollary: even if potential avoiders’ appropriate
estimates of the equivalent-dollar costs and benefits that their various avoidance-options would
generate were always accurate and even if the accident law of a liberal, rights-based State of
perfect moral integrity would always require accident-participants to make all those avoidancemoves that would reduce the certainty-equivalent equivalent-dollar loss they imposed on others
that would be allocatively efficient for them to make and only those avoidance-moves in this
category that would be allocatively efficient for them to make, the common law of torts of such a
State would not legally obligate potential injurers who belonged to the set of potential victims of
their own injurious conduct always to make allocatively-efficient avoidance-choices.

In

particular, given that private actors in a liberal, rights-based State do not have an obligation to
maximize their own equivalent-dollar interests when their failure to do so would not violate any
other rights or obligations, a liberal, rights-based State would not be morally obligated to impose
38

The governments of liberal, rights-based States might also be obligated to prohibit and prevent prostitution
and polygamy if there were sufficiently good reason to believe that participation in these activities or relationships
would in practice cause some of the participants to lose their ability to make autonomous choices.
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a legal duty on injurer-victims to make an avoidance-move that would increase allocative
efficiency when the avoidance-move in question would not on balance decrease the certaintyequivalent equivalent-dollar harm the chooser imposed on others (when the sign of the move’s
impact on allocative efficiency was critically influenced by the fact that it would reduce the
certainty-equivalent equivalent-dollar loss the injurer-victim in question would inflict on
himself). This conclusion implies that the common law of torts of a liberal, rights-based State
would fail to increase allocative efficiency by imposing a legal duty on relevant actors to make
avoidance-moves whose allocative efficiency was critically affected by the equivalent-dollar
gains those moves would enter on the potential injurer/victims in question.
B.

The Fact That, in Many Circumstances, a Liberal, Rights-Based State’s Members and
Participants Will Not Be Obligated to Make Ex Ante Allocatively-Efficient Rescue
Attempts
My discussion of the duty-to-rescue-oriented corollaries of liberalism argued that, for two

or possibly three reasons, the members of and participants in a liberal, rights-based society may
not have a duty to execute an ex ante allocatively-efficient rescue-attempt. First, when the
potential rescuee will suffer a “mere-utility loss” if he is not rescued and the potential rescuer has
no promise-related, status-related, or culpable-causation-related duty to attempt the relevant
rescue, the potential rescuer will have no duty to attempt the relevant rescue even if its execution
would be ex ante allocatively efficient. Second, even if the potential rescuee may be prevented
from leading a life of moral integrity if he is not rescued, the potential rescuer will have no duty
to attempt a rescue if the rescue-attempt would subject him to a significant risk of substantial
bodily harm or death, regardless of whether he had the option of executing a rescue-attempt that
would be ex ante allocatively efficient. Third, and more contestably, even if each individual
member of a multi-member set of potential rescuers would be morally obligated to execute an
allocatively-efficient rescue-attempt if he were the only person in a position to make such a
rescue-attempt, no individual potential rescuer may be obligated to make the ex ante allocativelyefficient rescue-attempt when more than one person way in a position to make such a rescueattempt. If for any of these reasons the members of or participants in a liberal, rights-based
society are not morally obligated to make an ex ante allocatively-efficient rescue-attempt, the
common law of torts of such a society will not be allocatively efficient in that it will fail to
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impose a legal duty on such parties to make ex ante allocatively-efficient rescue-attempts even if
it would be allocatively efficient for it to do so.
C.

The Fact That the Value or Moral Significance That Liberals Assign to the Pleasure That
Invaders of Privacy, Batterers, Rapists, and False Imprisoners Obtain Because Their Acts
Inflict Pain on, Degrade, and Control Their Victims Differs From the Value That Would
Be Assigned to Such (Illicit) Pleasures in an Allocative-Efficiency Analysis
The fact that invasions of privacy, batteries, rapes, and false imprisonment give their

perpetrators pleasure by inflicting pain on, degrading, and/or controlling their victims may
increase their allocative efficiency—in particular, will affect their allocative efficiency by (1) the
number of dollars the relevant injurers would have to obtain in an inherently-neutral way to be
left as well off as these pleasures left them minus (2) the net external costs (plus the net external
benefits) that (I hope) the generation of such pleasures impose on others who disapprove or
approve of individuals’ obtaining such pleasures.39 Such illicit pleasures may therefore either
favor or disfavor the allocative efficiency of the acts that generate them. By way of contrast,
39

At least orally, some Law & Economics scholars contend that the equivalent-dollar gains and losses
individuals experience because they approve or disapprove of some act or state of affairs should not be counted in
allocative-efficiency analysis. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis
When Preferences Are Distorted in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES (MATTHEW D. ADLER AND ERIC A. POSNER, eds.) 269, 276-77 (2002). However, these scholars have
no principled argument for this conclusion—i.e., their only justification for it is the supposed difficulty of measuring
such equivalent-dollar gains and losses. In fact, in our worse-than-second-best world (in which Pareto imperfections
abound and both data and analysis are inevitably costly and data is virtually always imperfect), I am not convinced
that it will be less practicable to estimate such moral-value-generated equivalent-dollar gains and losses than to
estimate the kinds of equivalent-dollar consequences on which conventional allocative-efficiency analysis focuses or
is supposed to focus. I should say that some philosophers have reached a related conclusion that the overall
desirability of a choice should not be affected by so-called “external preferences” (preferences for or against other
people’s gains and losses) for a very different reason—viz., because, in their view, a procedure that counts external
preferences is inegalitarian in that it counts more than once the utility of anyone for whose utility there are net
external preferences and less than once the utility of anyone for whose utility there are net external dispreferences. I
disagree with this latter position (taken, for example, by RONALD DWORKIN in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at 234-38
[1977]). To my mind, taking external preferences into account is not counting the utility of the relevant winner
twice. The direct winner’s utility-gain counts only directly. The fact that it counts indirectly as well when it shows
up in someone else’s utility function does not involve double-counting any more than would counting the utility
someone else obtained because the utility-gain of the direct winner induced the direct winner to change his behavior
in ways that benefited the second party in question. Of course, from some value-perspectives, some external
preferences and dispreferences (such as an external dispreference based on a prejudice) might not deserve to be
given a positive weight (indeed, might even be assigned a negative weight) at the overall-desirability-evaluation
stage of the policy-evaluation process (indeed, might [as the text indicates] render the choice in question rightsviolative if it critically affected the chooser’s choice). See the immediately-following text and note 40 infra. For
perceptive discussions of much of the relevant economic and philosophical literature, see Howard Chang, The
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such illicit pleasures will never favor the moral permissibility of the acts that yield them from a
liberal perspective. Indeed, from a liberal perspective, the fact that the acts in question generate
such illicit pleasures may render them morally impermissible—i.e., may count against them
more severely than the statement that they would be assigned a negative value would suggest.
Indeed, I say “may” only because the fact that an act generates illicit satisfactions may render it
morally impermissible only if those satisfactions critically affected its attractiveness to its
perpetrator.40
Economists are wont to make two arguments against the conclusion that tort decisions
that impose costs on actors whose choices give them illicit pleasures (in my terms but not theirs,
that correctly enforce liberal norms in illicit-pleasure tort-cases) may be allocatively inefficient.41

Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) and A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility,
and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 22 (2000).
40
In our society, people who consider themselves to be “liberal” in the sense in which I am using this term
take at least three different positions on the moral significance of the fact that the perpetrator of an act had an illicit
motive for committing it. First, some argue that an individual’s motivation for committing an act is irrelevant to its
permissibility. I think this position is clearly wrong. The liberal duty of appropriate, equal respect and concern
seems to me to imply that the fact that an act manifested its perpetrator’s disrespect and lack of concern for one or
more others is highly relevant to its moral permissibility. Thus, the fact that an executive in a large company chose
not to promote a Black employee because he was prejudiced against Blacks strikes me as highly relevant to whether
his decision violates the rejected candidate’s moral rights (say, in a case in which the Black candidate was equallyqualified but not more qualified than the successful non-Black candidate and could have made no justified moral
objection if a random-choice procedure resulted in the white candidate’s selection). (A related issue of
contemporary interest is whether a crime is made worse if it is motivated by hate.) Second, some individuals who
consider themselves to be liberal in my sense argue that the fact that an individual’s commission of an act was
motivated by its satisfying his illicit desires renders it morally impermissible only if he would not have found it
attractive on balance (henceforth “profitable”) but for its satisfying some of his illicit desires. Third, some liberals
would argue that the basic liberal principle of appropriate, equal respect and concern implies that any act is rendered
morally impermissible by its satisfying the actor’s illicit desires (A) at all, (B) to a significant extent, or (C)
sufficiently to make it “profitable” to him on that account alone even though this consequence was not necessary for
its being “profitable” for him. (In the United States, Constitutional Law experts disagree about a related issue—viz.,
whether an analog of the second or an analog of some variant of the third position just described should be the test
for whether the fact that some of those who made a State decision had an illicit motive for doing so renders it
unconstitutional. The analog to the second position would be that the unconstitutional motivation [say] of some
legislators render a statute they passed unconstitutional only if it was essential to the passage of the legislation in
question. The analog to the third test would be that a statute is rendered unconstitutional by the illicit motivation of
[some of] the legislators who supported it only if a significant number of the legislative supporters of the legislation
were significantly unconstitutionally motivated to support it, only if a significant number though not necessarily a
critical number of its supporters would have rejected it but for their unconstitutional motivations, or only if the
relevant unconstitutional motivations were a sufficient condition for its passage. My own position on this moralrights issue [and on the Constitutional-law issue discussed in this parenthetical] is the second position delineated
above.)
41
Economists are not inclined to make a third argument that favors their conclusion—viz., the argument that
such legal decisions encourage such rights-violations not only by increasing the “profitability” of rights-violating
conduct to individuals whose preferences make such conduct allocatively efficient by reducing the “law-related
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First, they point out correctly that moral-rights-violating behavior that would be allocatively
efficient if it affected no-one else’s choices generate allocative costs by making it “profitable”
for its perpetrator’s potential victims to make allocatively-costly avoidance-moves. Although
this consequence is obviously relevant to the actual allocative efficiency of the relevant moralrights-violating conduct and hence to the allocative inefficiency of decisions to make the relevant
moral-rights violators civilly liable, there would be no reason to believe that it would always be
critical even if this effect of such a decision were not at least somewhat offset by the tendency of
decisions to impose civil liability on such violators to increase their incentive to escape detection
and hence the allocative costs they generate when attempting to escape detection.
Second, economists argue that decisions to hold moral-rights violators liable in these
cases will tend to be allocatively efficient because they will induce the perpetrators to purchase
as opposed to taking what they want—i.e., because they will tend to induce the perpetrators to
engage in voluntary market transactions. According to this argument, this tendency promotes
allocative efficiency because it puts to a market test the perpetrator’s claim that the equivalentdollar value to him of “what he took” is higher than the equivalent-dollar cost to his victim of
“his taking what he took.” Although there is something to this argument, for two reasons, it does
not demonstrate the universal, greater allocative efficiency of market transactions or legal rules
that encourage them. The first such reason is less interesting and may be less important: the
argument ignores the allocative mechanical transaction cost of voluntary market transactions.
Even if, allocative transaction costs aside, voluntary market transactions tend to be more
allocatively efficient than involuntary transfers, at least in some identifiable sets of cases, the
differences in question may be smaller than the allocative-transaction-cost savings the
involuntary transfers permit.
The second reason is more interesting and may be critical in those instances in which it is
relevant: the allocative-efficiency argument for inducing individuals to purchase what they want
in a voluntary market transaction rather than to take it ignores the fact that the acts of purchasing

cost” of engaging in it but also by encouraging people to develop such preferences in the first place (or, perhaps
more accurately, by deterring them from combating the development of such preferences) not just by increasing the
profitability of satisfying them but by “expressing” a tolerance for them. I suspect that economists’ failure to make
this argument (indeed, their general reluctance to admit the “expressive” function of law) reflects their tendency to
assume that tastes or preferences are exogenous to the system.
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and selling some “things” in a voluntary market transaction sometimes change what is
“transferred” from both the original possessor’s and the later possessor’s points of view in ways
that affect the equivalent-dollar value the later possessor obtains and the equivalent-dollar cost
the original possessor incurs and derivatively affects the allocative efficiency of “the transfer” in
question. Thus, one cannot buy friendship, and paid-for sex is not the same thing as rape or
voluntary, unpaid-for sex from either participant’s perspective. Because a rapist may place a
higher equivalent-dollar value on rape than on purchased sex if he views the rape as more
controlling of or more degrading to his victims and because a woman may find it more degrading
or self-definitionally costly to sell sexual services than to be the (involuntary) victim of a rape,
the fact that the highest price that a rapist would have been willing to pay his victim for her
sexual services in a voluntary market transaction is lower than the lowest price his victim would
have been willing to accept in a voluntary market transaction in exchange for her sexual services
is perfectly compatible with the rape’s having been allocatively efficient—i.e., with the
conclusion that the equivalent-dollar gain the rapist obtained from his act exceeds the equivalentdollar loss it imposed on his victim. If so, a legal rule that prevented rapes in the relevant set of
circumstances would generate some allocative inefficiency. Indeed, the legal rule in question
would even generate some allocative inefficiency if it induced a sale of the sexual service if the
difference between the equivalent-dollar value and cost of the sold service were lower than its
counterpart for the rape.
In short, neither of the arguments that economists make against the conclusion that it will
sometimes be allocatively inefficient to make privacy-invaders, batterers, rapists, or false
imprisoners who take illicit pleasure from their acts civilly or criminally liable carries the day.
Hence, in some privacy, battery, rape, and false imprisonment cases, it will be allocatively
inefficient for tort law to effectuate liberal corrective-justice norms.
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D.

The Fact That the Value or Moral Significance That Liberals Assign to the Loss That
Victims of Privacy-Invasions, Batteries, Rapes, and False Imprisonments Sustain Differs
From the Value That Would Be Assigned to Those Losses in an Allocative-Efficiency
Analysis
This point is exactly parallel to its predecessor. In this case, the critical point is that, even

if the allocative-efficiency analysis takes account of the net equivalent-dollar loss the relevant
injurious act imposes on non-traditional victims whose value-commitments (presumably) lead
them to disvalue the traditional victims’ suffering such losses as well as the number of dollars the
traditional victims would have to lose in an inherently-neutral way to be left in a position that
those victims would regard as equivalent to the position in which the injurious act would leave
them, the effect of such losses on allocative efficiency (the negative equivalent-dollar effect of
such losses) would not be the same as the liberal “cost” of such losses. As I have already
indicated, at least in part, this difference reflects the fact that liberals are not bound by the
evaluations that the actual victims and disapproving “observers” give to such losses, and in part
it reflects the fact that liberals use a different “currency” to value such losses—value them not in
terms of their direct and indirect equivalent-dollar effects but in terms of the disrespect they
manifest for the victims in question and usually for all members of the society in question as well
as of their direct and indirect effects on both the direct victims’ and others’ having and taking
advantage of the opportunity to lead lives of moral integrity. I should add that this analysis will
apply regardless of whether one is focusing on the consequences of the injurious act or the
consequences of the State’s finding that act wrongful and requiring its perpetrator to compensate
its traditional victim(s).
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E.

The Reality That Some Accident-Participants Who Have Done Appropriate Research
Into the Avoidance-Moves That Are Available to Them and the Net Effect of These
Choices on Either Allocative Efficiency or the Opportunities That Their Society’s
Members and Participants Have to Lead Lives of Moral Integrity May Misestimate Those
Options’ Consequences in Ways That Lead Them to Reach the Mistaken but SelfJustifying Conclusion That They Are Morally Obligated to Make a Particular AvoidanceMove That Is Available to Them (That Lead Them to Reach the Otherwise-Mistaken
Conclusion That, in Effect, They Are Morally Obligated to Execute the Move in
Question)
The fourth “reason” why the common law of torts of a liberal, rights-based State of

perfect moral integrity would not maximize allocative efficiency is rather complicated. This
argument proceeds in three stages. The first establishes that even tort cogenerators who have
fulfilled their duty to do research into the identity and relevant consequences of their various
available avoidance-options will sometimes misestimate the consequences of making one or
more of the avoidance-moves they currently believe they could make in ways that lead them to
make the self-justifying mistake of concluding that they are morally obligated to make the
move(s) in question. This mistake is self-justifying because, once the chooser has concluded
mistakenly that he was morally obligated to make a particular avoidance-move that was available
to him, this mistaken conclusion renders his rejection of the move in question wrongful.
Admittedly, the avoidance-move the mistaken injurer failed to make would not have been
allocatively efficient (in cases in which the relevant possible loss was a mere-utility loss) or
would not have increased the on-balance opportunity of relevant individuals to lead lives of
moral integrity (in cases in which the relevant possible loss was a loss that could have reduced
such opportunities). However, that fact is consistent with the relevant choice’s inflicting a mereutility loss on some individuals or depriving some individuals of the opportunity to lead a life of
moral integrity—i.e., with the relevant choice’s having wrongfully inflicted a recoverable loss on
some moral-rights holders. (This conclusion has no counterpart in the situation in which the
injurer believed ex ante that he had an avoidance-move option [that he was obligated to make use
of] that he did not in fact have since, in such a situation, his wrongful rejection of this nonexistent option could not harm anyone.) Unless the fact that the wrongful rejection of the
avoidance-move in question did not generate a net loss of the relevant kind (conferred net
benefits of the relevant kind on others [including possibly the injurer]) that were at least as big as
the loss it imposed on its victims for some reason extinguishes the victim’s rights, the victim
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would be entitled to recover the loss he suffered because his mistaken injurer wrongfully rejected
an avoidance-move that was available to him. I can think of no such reason, though the tort-law
rule that victims who have suffered a mere pecuniary loss are not entitled to recovery gives me
some pause on this account (since the distinguishing feature of at least some pecuniary-loss cases
[e.g., cases in which the plaintiff is a restaurant-owner whose place of business is located next to
a formerly-pleasant river rendered foul by culpably-caused pollution] is that, from an allocativeefficiency perspective, most of the victim’s losses are “offset” by gains to his rivals [other
restaurant-owners who make sales to the customers who no longer frequent the riverside
establishment]).
The second stage of the relevant argument focuses on the allocative inefficiency of the
avoidance-move the potential injurer mistakenly but self-justifyingly believes he was morally
obligated to make. When the loss the potential injurer believed he might generate was a mereutility loss and he should have expected ex ante that his act or activity would impose net
equivalent-dollar accident-or-pollution losses on others if he did not avoid, his obligation was to
make allocatively-efficient avoidance-decisions, and the move he mistakenly concluded he was
obligated to make must have been allocatively inefficient. When the loss the potential injurer
believed he might generate was an on-balance reduction in the opportunity that relevant
individuals had to lead a life of moral integrity, the move he mistakenly but self-justifyingly
believed he was morally obligated to make may or may not have been allocatively inefficient,
but clearly some of the moves in question will have been allocatively inefficient.
The third stage of the relevant argument explains why it will be allocatively inefficient
for the courts to enforce the rights of such victims. The best explanation I can provide is that
doing so will be allocative-transaction-costly, will tend to decrease the allocative efficiency of
potential-victim avoidance-decisions, and will have an ambiguous effect on the allocative
efficiency of potential-injurer avoidance-decisions. Decisions to enforce victims’ rights in these
cases will probably increase transaction costs by leading victims to bring suits they would not
otherwise have brought and by causing the court in question and future courts to investigate the
relevant mistake-issue in any such cases that are brought (even though such decisions may also
tend to reduce the allocative transaction costs and public-finance-connected non-transaction-cost
allocative costs generated by loss-related government-transfer claims that would be prevented by
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tort awards). Moreover, even in our highly-Pareto-imperfect world, a decision to enforce the
victim’s rights will tend to decrease the allocative efficiency of potential-victim avoidancedecisions by reducing the incentive of victims to make presumptively-allocative-efficient
avoidance-decisions whose rejection will not be deemed contributorily negligent either because
the move in question is a type of move whose rejection is never assessed for contributory
negligence (or negligence) or because impacted information will cause the trier of fact to make a
false-negative error on the contributory-negligence issue. Admittedly, such decisions will have
an ambiguous effect on the misallocation that potential injurers generate when making
avoidance-decisions. In the one direction, to the extent that such a decision will induce potential
injurers who mistakenly believed that some avoidance-move available to them was allocatively
efficient to make the move in question, it will tend to decrease allocative efficiency on that
account. In the other direction, to the extent that such a decision will induce potential injurers to
make avoidance-moves they correctly perceived to be ex ante allocatively efficient by
establishing that they will be liable for the losses their rejection of these moves generate even if
their perception turns out to have been wrong, it will tend to increase allocative-efficiency on this
account (particularly in our highly-Pareto-imperfect world in which the relevant imperfections
already deflate potential-injurer avoidance-incentives on balance42). If, as I suspect, these two
effects on the allocative efficiency of potential-injurer avoidance-decisions are pretty much a
wash, decisions by courts to enforce the rights of victims in these mistake cases will be
allocatively inefficient on balance.
F.

The Reality That Some Accident-Participants Who Have Correctly Identified the
Avoidance-Moves Available to Them and Correctly Estimated Their Net Effect on the
Extent to Which the Relevant Society’s Members Take Their Lives Morally Seriously or
on Allocative Efficiency May Still Incorrectly Conclude That They Are Morally
Obligated to Make a Particular Avoidance-Move Because They Have Made One or More
Mathematical Errors
This argument is perfectly analogous to the argument of the preceding subsection.

42

For an explanation, see Richard S. Markovits, The Allocative Efficiency of Shifting From a “Negligence”
System to a “Strict-Liability” Regime in Our Highly-Pareto-Imperfect Economy: A Partial and Preliminary ThirdBest-Allocative-Efficiency Analysis, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 20, 38-95 (1998).
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G.

The Possibility That Adjudicators in a Liberal, Rights-Based State That Fulfills All Its
Moral Obligations at the Time of Decision May Have Made Internally-Incorrect,
Allocatively-Inefficient Decisions in the Past That Have Legitimate, Critical Precedential
Weight
Even if one assumes (contrary to fact) that, in cases of first impression, the internally-

correct answer to all accident-law issues would be allocatively efficient, the internally-correct
answer to some of those legal issues in later cases may be allocatively inefficient if those issues
were internally-incorrectly resolved in an allocatively-inefficient way in earlier cases and
decisions to correct the earlier errors would wrong parties who reasonably relied on the
precedents in question.

This conclusion reflects the fact that the moral significance that

liberalism attributes to such precedents may be different from the impact of their existence on the
allocative efficiency of following them.43
H.

The Possibility That Pareto Imperfections May Create Situations in Which the
Compensatory Damages That Corrective-Justice Requires Will Not Induce the Relevant
Actors to Make Allocatively-Efficient Avoidance-Moves
As I have explained elsewhere in great detail,44
(1)

imperfections in seller and buyer competition, externalities that will not be
internalized by the tort-law decision in question, taxes on the margin of income,
actor non-sovereignty and non-maximization, and buyer surplus can all distort the
private profitability of avoidance-moves both individually and collectively,

(2)

potential-avoider non-sovereignty and non-maximization can both individually
and collectively cause potential avoiders to make unprofitable decisions to reject
profitable avoidance-moves or to make unprofitable avoidance-moves, and as a
result

(3)

potential avoiders may not make allocatively-efficient avoidance-decisions even if
the law will make them compensate their conventional tort-loss co-generators for
the losses their allocatively-inefficient avoidance-move rejections impose on
them—i.e., there is no reason to believe that the net distortion in the private
profitability of avoidance that Pareto imperfections would generate and the errors

43

For a detailed analysis of the factors that affect the appropriate weight for a liberal, rights-based society to
give to precedent if it adopts a system in which previous legal decisions may affect the legal rights of parties to legal
disputes, see Markovits, op. cit. supra note 33 at 72-74.
44
See Markovits, op. cit. supra note 42 at 46-50 and 74-48 (1998) and Richard S. Markovits, Monopoly and
the Allocative Inefficiency of First-Best-Economically-Efficient Tort-law: The Whys and Some Therefores, 46 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 313 (1996).
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that potential avoiders would commit when making their avoidance-decisions
would in the relevant sense cancel each other out.
Since adjudicators in common-law tort cases in liberal, rights-based societies are obligated to set
damages at a level equal to the loss the victims suffered,45 it would be internally incorrect for
them to adjust their damage-award in a given case to the level that would be required to induce
(say) the injurer to make allocatively-efficient avoidance-decisions. Indeed, even if the damageawards required by liberal corrective justice include compensation for the transaction costs an
entitled victim reasonably incurred to pursue his claim and even if potential victims of a culpable
non-avoider are entitled to receive compensation for the risk costs their injurer’s non-avoidance
imposed on them, the internally-correct damage-award in a common-law tort case in a liberal,
rights-based society may be allocatively inefficient.
The following two numerical examples illustrate this possibility. The first illustrates the
problems that Pareto imperfections beyond the control of the tort-case adjudicator can cause by
distorting the profitability of avoidance even if the relevant potential avoider is a sovereign
maximizer. Assume the following facts:
(1)

the private cost of the rejected allocatively-efficient avoidance move to the injurer
was $105;

(2)

those private costs were undistorted—i.e., the allocative cost of the relevant
avoidance-move was also $105;

(3)

both the potential victims and the potential injurer are indifferent to risk;

(4)

the rejected allocatively-efficient avoidance-move would have reduced from 20%
to 10% the probability of the victim’s suffering a $1,000 loss—i.e., would have
reduced the potential victim’s weighted-average-expected loss by $100;

(5)

the victim would not have had to incur any private transaction costs to collect his
claim if his injurer would be found liable, and the processing of any loss-related
legal claims (and insurance and government-transfer claims) would generate no
allocative transaction costs;

45

I ignore punitive damages, whose award in any event would not be guided by the goal of maximizing
allocative efficiency. I should add that I suspect that the award of punitive damages may be illegitimate in commonlaw tort cases in a liberal, rights-based society—at least to the extent that such damages do not constitute
compensation for the extra harm the victim suffered because of the particularly-insulting character of the choice that
made the injurer liable. This conclusion is compatible with the legitimacy of a liberal State’s imposing civil fines or
criminal penalties on injurers whose conduct might currently cause them to have to pay punitive damages.
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(6)

the $1,000 loss the injurer’s avoidance-move might have prevented would have
consisted solely of lost wages that the avoidance would have prevented by
preventing the temporary disablement of the victim in question;

(7)

because the potential victim’s labor increased the unit output of an imperfect
competitor who did not engage in price discrimination and whose valuation of the
victim’s labor-product was not distorted by any other Pareto imperfection, the
allocative benefits that the avoidance would have generated if it prevented the
potential victim’s disablement (the allocative value of his output if [as I will
assume] he was indifferent between working in an uninjured state and consuming
leisure while temporarily disabled) would have been $1200;46 and

(8)

the potential avoiders (injurers) whose avoidance-choices will be affected by the
legal ruling in question will be large, sophisticated companies that either will
know or should know that the allocative value of their potential victims’ labor
will be higher than the victims’ wages—more particularly, that the allocative
benefits of avoidance will be $120=(10% of $1200) rather than $100=(10% of
$1,000)—and that the avoidance-move in question will therefore be allocatively
efficient.

Now assume that the adjudicator knows all these facts, concludes on this basis that the
injurer’s avoidance-move rejection was wrongful, and therefore holds the injurer liable. In this
type of case, corrective justice would require that the injurer fully compensate the victim for his
loss—i.e., pay the victim $1,000. But if the injurer did not have to incur any private transaction
costs to settle or litigate the victim’s claim or to pay these damages (and possibly even if he did),
the prospect of these damages’ being awarded would not induce him or his future counterparts to
make the allocatively-efficient avoidance-move in question since the private cost to him (and
them) of rejecting that move (the weighted-average-expected amount of damages the rejection
would cause him to pay—10% of $1,000=$100) would be lower than the private cost to him of
making the move ($105).
The second example illustrates the relevance of the potential avoider’s non-sovereignty
and non-maximization in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect world. This example maintains all the
assumptions of its predecessor except that it assumes that the private benefits of avoidance were
46

Roughly speaking, ceteris paribus, the allocative value of the unit output produced by a laborer who works
for a non-discriminating imperfect competitor will be higher than the value of his output to his employer (and hence
the wage the worker receives) because the allocative value of his output equals the price for which it will be sold
while its value to his employer depends on the lower marginal revenue its sale yields him.
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not distorted and that the private cost of avoidance was $95. In this case, the avoidance-move
would have increased allocative efficiency by $5, the potential injurer in question would be
culpable and therefore be found liable for rejecting it, and the avoidance-move in question would
therefore be profitable for him to make. But now assume that—despite that fact—the relevant
potential injurer would not make the move in question because he would underestimate the
relevant private and allocative benefits, overestimate the relevant private and allocative costs, or
simply not pay attention. In such a situation, allocative efficiency might be increased by a rule
that awarded victims supra-compensatory damages—i.e., the allocative-efficiency gains such a
rule would generate by inducing potential injurers to avoid by causing them to pay more
attention, to make more accurate estimates of the relevant costs and benefits, or to do their maths
correctly might exceed the allocative-efficiency losses the rule might generate by inducing
victims to reduce allocative efficiency by putting themselves in harm’s way by making
allocatively-inefficient choices that will not in practice be found contributorily negligent and by
inducing potential injurers who fear that they may be incorrectly found to have been negligent to
overavoid from the perspective of allocative efficiency. However, even if this is the case, it
would be internally-incorrect for adjudicators in common-law tort cases in a liberal, rights-based
State to award entitled tort-victims supra-compensatory damages.
I.

The Possibility That No Damage Award a Court Could Make Would Minimize the
Amount of Misallocation Caused by the Type of Contingency With Which a Given Tort
Case Was Concerned
So far I have assumed that, if the liberal conception of corrective justice required a

common-law court in a liberal, rights-based society to award the plaintiff in a common-law tort
suit the damages that would minimize tort-contingency-related misallocation, a perfectlyinformed trier-of-fact and court would be able to do so. This section points out that, in many
situations, even if the court makes the damage-award that is the most-allocatively-efficient award
it could make, its decision would not constitute the most-allocatively-efficient response the State
could make to the relevant tort contingency for reasons unrelated to the allocative-transactioncostliness of adjudicative proceedings.
The problem is that
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(1)

in general, in order for a public decisionmaker to be able to induce X types of
decisions to be made allocatively efficiently, he must have X policy-instruments
at his disposal and

(2)

when the allocatively-efficient response for private actors to make to a tort
contingency includes fixed-cost as well as variable-cost decisions, common-law
courts will not have enough policy-instruments to induce all the relevant types of
decisions to be made in an allocatively-efficient way.

For example, when the allocatively-efficient response to a possible-rescue contingency involves
the execution of allocatively-efficient rescue-operation investments as well as the execution of
rescue-attempts that are allocatively efficient, given the investments that have been made, the
most-allocatively-efficient award that courts could offer a successful rescuer might not minimize
the total allocative cost the relevant contingency generates because the award that would
eliminate rescue-attempt, rescue-attempt-offer acceptance/rejection, and potential-rescueeavoidance misallocation might cause rescue-operation-investment misallocation and vice versa—
i.e., because the most-allocatively-efficient response to the relevant contingency would require
an appropriate set of investment-subsidies to be combined with an appropriate set of damageawards.47`
I should not close this section without admitting that this possibility may not belong in
Part 2’s list since it does not suggest a reason why a common law court should not make the
most-allocatively-efficient decisions it could make—i.e., because it indicates only that in some
circumstances that decision will not be so allocatively efficient as a more complicated policypackage to which it might belong.
*

*

*

I have placed asterisks at the end of the preceding paragraph because the next three
reasons why the common law of torts of a liberal, rights-based society may not be allocatively
efficient are connected to what I will refer to as our society’s binary conception of correctivejustice rights. According to this “binary” conception of corrective-justice rights, in order to
demonstrate that he has a corrective-justice right to compensation from someone he alleges has

47

For a detailed theoretical analysis of this kind of possibility, see Richard S. Markovits, Marine-Salvage
Law and Marine-Peril-Related Policy: A Second-best and Third-Best Economic-Efficiency Analysis of the Problem,
the Law, and the Classic Landes and Posner Study (unpublished article manuscript under submission, 2005).
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wrongfully and tortiously harmed him, a victim must establish that more probably than not the
defendant made a wrongful choice that violated his duty to the victim and that was a but-for
cause of the victim’s loss.48 This conception of corrective-justice rights is “binary” because,
under it, a “defendant” who may have been a wrongful but-for cause of a loss is liable for the full
loss if it is found that, more probably than not, he made a wrongful choice that was a but-for
cause of the loss’ occurrence (regardless of the fact that the probability that he made a wrongful
choice that was a but-for cause of the loss was under 100%) and is liable for none of the loss if
the probability of his having been a wrongful but-for cause of the loss was not higher than 50%
(despite the fact that the probability that he had made a wrongful choice that was a but-for cause
of the loss was higher than 0%).
This conception of corrective-justice-right claims has two critical elements. The first is
the “but-for cause” element of moral causation, which I perceive to be an ineliminable feature of
any conception of corrective-justice-right claims—i.e., not to be particularly connected to either
liberalism or the binary conception of corrective justice. The second element of the binary
conception of corrective-justice-right claims is its more-probable-than not element, which is its
defining component and determines the loss-division it sanctions in all cases in which the loss
has not been but-for caused more probably than not by the wrongful conduct of both the putative
injurer and the victim. Although I do not find this defining feature of the binary conception of
corrective justice inconsistent with liberal principles of justice, I also do not think that it is
entailed by liberalism. Loss-division protocols under which the division of the loss varies more
continuously with probabilities of wrongful but-for causation would seem to me to be equally
compatible with liberal concerns that possible wrongful injurers

be treated in a way that

encourages them to consider themselves to be the authors of their own lives and that possiblywronged victims be treated with the respect that is their due.

48

I realize that the common law of the United States may not have adopted this rule of liability even in
negligence cases—in particular, may require that the victim show only that (1) more probably than not, the
defendant caused the loss. To see why this requirement differs from the corrective-justice requirement I have
articulated, assume that (1) the probability that the defendant behaved wrongfully is 70% and (2) the probability that
the defendant’s wrongful conduct would have caused the loss had eh engaged in it is 50%. On these fact, the
defendant would be liable under American law as described even though the probability that he wrongfully caused
the loss—(70%)(60%)=42%—was not higher than 50% (was not sufficiently high for the plaintiff to have
established his corrective-justice claim against the defendant).
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In any event, the first two of the next three reasons why the common law of torts of a
liberal, rights-based society may not be allocatively efficient relate to the “but-for causation”
conception of moral responsibility that I do think is primitively correct and therefore not
specially connected to liberalism, and the last of these three reasons is at least somewhat
connected to the binary character of our society’s conception of corrective-justice rights, which I
believe is consistent with though not required by liberal commitments.
J.

Simultaneous-Independent-Causation Cases and the “But-For Causation” Element of
Corrective-Justice-Right Claims
Assume that (1) the independent choices of two or more actors belonged to two or more

different sets of sufficient conditions for the generation of some loss, (2) each such choice would
be allocatively inefficient if none of the other choices were made, (3) all such choices combined
were allocatively inefficient, (4) the relevant sets of sufficient conditions were fulfilled at times
that resulted in two or more such sets’ “causing” the loss to occur simultaneously, and (perhaps
redundantly) (5) the loss was not increased by the fulfillment of more than one set of the relevant
sets of sufficient conditions. In situations of this kind, it would be allocatively efficient to
prevent the relevant choices from being made. However, for two reasons, no court may be
authorized to resolve a common-law (corrective-justice-based) tort suit in such a situation in the
way that would be allocatively efficient. First, in this type of situation, the corrective-justicebased common law of torts may not be able to secure allocative efficiency by holding all the
relevant choosers liable because no individual chooser was a but-for cause of the loss that
resulted. (I will refer to choosers in this situation as “putative injurers” because no such choosers
are “but-for causes” of the loss.)
Second, in at least some of these situations, a common-law court may not be authorized
to reach the allocatively-efficient conclusion because none of the putative injurers may have
behaved wrongfully. At least, this conclusion is warranted when (1) the individual putative
injurers’ failures to avoid were independent—when each believed that the others would fail to
avoid regardless of what he did, (2) each individual putative injurer knew that one or more others
was sufficiently likely not to avoid for his avoidance-move rejection not to be allocatively
inefficient or wrongful for a life-of-moral-integrity-related reason, and (3) the profitability or
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attractiveness of not avoiding to each putative injurer was not critically affected by his desire to
have the loss generated.49
An ingenious argument made by my colleague David Robertson requires me to qualify
the preceding two paragraphs. Robertson suggests that, at least when there are just two putative
injurers whose choices are members of one or more sets of sufficient causes of a loss whose
fulfillment will “cause” that loss simultaneously and neither avoids, each is a wrongful cause of
the loss because each has either caused the physical loss wrongfully or tortiously impaired the
victim’s cause of action against the other.50

Robertson is bothered by the fact that the

“impairment loss” is a pure economic loss. However, that American-positive-law concern is not
germane to my argument: although in some cases there may be sound grounds for holding pure
economic losses not to be actionable, doing so cannot be justified in the kind of situation with
which this section is concerned. Admittedly, Robertson’s argument would have the consequence
of causing a second potential avoider to engage in socially pointless, presumably costly
avoidance once a first potential avoider had mistakenly failed to avoid. But this possibility
would be practically important only if the first potential avoider made a mistake since
Robertson’s argument would make it profitable for the first potential avoider to avoid—at least if
it were conjoined with an appropriate set of damage-assignment rules.
In any event, standard textbook examples of this type of situation include cases in which
a house is simultaneously consumed by two or more fires each of which was caused wrongfully,
49

Each such choice would clearly be wrongful if all such choices were interdependent in the sense that none
would be made if we were not made since in such a situation each of the relevant choices would be a but-for cause
of the loss’ occurring. At least, this conclusion would be warranted if, as I suppose, such chooses could not absolve
themselves by arguing that they were not responsible for though he caused the choices of other because these
choices were made by autonomous choosers.
I also am confident that the individual choices in question are wrongful when each individual chooser
believes that his choice will be a but-for cause of the loss—does not know ex ante that the loss would be caused in
any case by the satisfaction of one or more other sets of conditions to which his choice does not belong (one or more
other sets that may or may not include human choices).
I admit, however, that in this situation the wrongfulness of the relevant choices is more problematic when
each individual chooser did not know and should not have known that his choice would affect the outcome—i.e., did
the research he was obligated to do and concluded, reasonably that the loss would occur regardless of what he did
because Mother Nature either on its own or in combination with choices of others would cause exactly the same loss
to occur at exactly the same time. I am inclined to say that some choices made in this situation are wrongful because
they manifest the chooser’s desire for the loss to be inflicted—i.e., because they manifest the chooser’s wrongful
disposition. Of course, this characterization will be justified only if the choice in question would not have been
attractive to the chooser had he not valued (however non-rationally) its connection to the loss’ generation.
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cases in which an individual is simultaneously killed by two or more bullets that were
wrongfully shot, and cases in which a pollution-loss was simultaneously caused by two or more
sets of pollutants that were wrongfully discharged by different polluters in circumstances in
which the second through nth set of pollutants did not affect the resulting loss.51 I suspect that
such simultaneous-causation cases occur very rarely, though the importance of possible cases of
this kind is undoubtedly enhanced by the inability of relevant victims to prove that, more
probably than not, one such set of sufficient causes “first caused” the loss.
K.

“Overdetermined” Step-Function-Loss Cases and the “But-For Causation” Element of
Corrective-Justice-Right Claims
Assume that the function that relates the loss that will result from varying amounts of

pollution’s being put into some medium is a “step function”—i.e., would be represented in a
two-dimensional diagram in which the loss was measured along the vertical axes and the
pollution along the horizontal axis as a series of disconnected horizontal lines that could be
connected by verticals at their successive end and beginning points. Environmental specialists
indicate that this type of loss function is not uncommon.52 Thus, it is said that in the riverpollution context, below some level of pollution, no harm results; suddenly, at a particular level,
one cannot swim in or fall into the river without incurring some health risk; over some range
above that level, additional pollution does not change the resulting loss; and then suddenly at
some higher level of pollution, the fish are no longer edible; again, over some range above this
latter level, additional pollution does not change the environmental loss; and then suddenly when
pollution increases above some level, the fish die and the river smells. Assume in addition that
(1) each of 30 polluters put two units of pollution into some body of water without influencing
his fellow polluters’ decisions to pollute, (2) no loss would be generated by the presence of zero
to 49.99 units of pollution, (3) $100 in mere-utility losses would be generated by the presence of
50 to 120 units of pollution, and (4) the cost to each polluter of eliminating part or all of his
50

See David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1787-89, 1789-99 &
n. 107 (1997).
51
In most such pollution cases, the choices of the individual polluters will not be wrongful for the reason
indicated at the end of note 48—viz., because, in most such cases, the decision to pollute would be profitable even
for a chooser who did not place a positive value on the pollution-loss that was generated.
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pollution was $4.

Although on these assumptions it would be allocatively efficient for 6

polluters to eliminate their pollution in the situation in question (although their reducing the total
amount of pollutants in the water from 60 units to 48 units would increase allocative efficiency
by $100-6[$4]=$76), the common law could not secure this result by making the polluters liable
to their victims because, for two reasons, no victim would have a corrective-justice claim against
any individual polluter: (1) because no polluter was a but-for cause of the loss in question
(because no individual polluter’s pollution affected the loss either directly or by influencing
other polluters’ pollution-decisions since each’s pollution raised total pollution from 58 to 60
units) and (2) because, on the above account no individual polluter behaved wrongfully by
polluting (since each’s pollution was allocatively efficient—saved him $4 in abatement costs and
caused no damage).
L.

Imperfections in the Information Available to the Trier-of-Fact on the “More Probable
Than Not” Element of the Operative Conception of Corrective-Justice-Right Claims
I have already referred to one kind of causation-information whose imperfect availability

can render allocatively inefficient the internally-correct resolution of a common-law tort case in
a liberal, rights-based State—information on whether a possible simultaneous-independentcausation case is an actual simultaneous-independent-causation case and, if not, on the identity
of the “first causer” of the loss in question. If the trier-of-fact cannot determine that there was a
“first causer” and/or the identity of the “first cause,” the common-law court will not be
authorized to hold any putative injurer liable even if one of them was a “first causer” and it
would be allocatively efficient for all of them to avoid. By way of contrast, if the trier-of-fact
could determine that there was a “first causer” and could identity not only him but also the
“second through nth causers,” it would be authorized to hold all of them liable if each’s failure to
avoid were wrongful because each would have been a but-for cause of part of the loss that
resulted. In fact, at least if each potential injurer should assume that the others would act as
sovereign maximizers if he avoided, the decision of the first potential injurer not to avoid would
be wrongful since, regardless of where he is placed in the time-ordering, the loss would not occur

52

See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, DALE W. HENDERSON, SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN,
JR., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1974).
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if he avoided and ex hypothesis the prevention of the loss’ occurring at any time was allocatively
efficient. I should add that in this situation there would also be no loss-division-injustice
problem: all the loss would be and should be allocated to the actor whose failure to avoid was a
but-for cause of its generation (i.e., to the initial non-avoider).
The second type of causation-information whose imperfect availability can make the
resolution of a common-law tort case that is correct as a matter of law allocatively inefficient
also relates to the identity of the putative injurer who was the but-for cause of the loss. Assume
that in a non-simultaneous-causation case the party who has suffered a loss (1) can demonstrate
that two or more actors who had a relevant duty toward them made duty-violating, allocativelyinefficient choices that more probably than not caused some individuals to suffer the kind of loss
the victim in question suffered but (2) cannot prove that, more probably than not, any particular
injurer had caused his loss. In some cases of this kind (e.g., when the loss was asbestositis that
was caused by the inhalation of one unit of asbestos and asbestos was wrongfully put into the air
that the victim breathed by two or more polluters, none of whom was more likely than not the
source of the asbestos the victim inhaled), at no point in time would it have been possible to
identify the particular wrongdoer who harmed the victim. In other cases of this kind (e.g., cases
in which the victim’s illness was caused by his ingestion several years earlier of a medicine that
was wrongfully produced by two or more pharmaceutical companies none of which was more
likely than not his ultimate supplier), it would have been possible at an earlier point in time to
identify the particular manufacturer-wrongdoer who harmed the victim in question (viz., at the
time at which the prescription-filling record was recoverable) but was no longer possible to do so
at the time at which the victim’s symptoms appeared, the cause of his illness was identified, or
the suit was brought. In both these kinds of case, there are wrongdoers whose allocativelyinefficient wrongdoing have caused harm and individual victims who have been harmed by the
allocatively-inefficient wrongdoing of individual wrongdoers, but it is not possible to match any
individual victim with the particular individual wrongdoer whose wrongdoing harmed him. In
this case as well, it would be wrong as a matter of law for a court in a common-law tort suit to
require injurers to pay the victims compensation that would provide potential injurers with
allocatively-efficient avoidance-incentives if I am correct that judges in common-law cases are
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authorized to make only those awards that the relevant society’s corrective-justice commitments
warrant.
However, I do not want to proceed without mentioning another possibility that Part 3 will
explore in more detail. In my judgment, even though no corrective-justice-based claim lies in
this sort of case, I do think that the government of a liberal, rights-based State has an obligation
to pass legislation that would require such wrongdoing possible injurers to compensate such
victims of tortious wrongdoing—perhaps by making each such possible injurer liable for the
share of each such victim’s loss that equals the probability that he caused that loss. Even if
courts are not authorized to secure this result by announcing and applying retrospectively and/or
prospectively something like a market-share-liability approach to these cases,53 the victims in
question may have a constitutional right that the legislature of their liberal, rights-based State
give them a statutory right to recover such amounts from the wrongdoers in question and a
related constitutional right to recover damages from the State if it fails to fulfill this legislative
duty. Hence, even if a court was not authorized to resolve a common-law tort suit against such
wrongdoing possible injurers by requiring them to compensate these victims, it might well be
authorized—indeed, required—to respond to a joined constitutional claim by victims in this
category to whom the State had granted no statutory right of recovery to recover their loss from
the State.
The third type of causation-information whose imperfect availability can make the
resolution of a common-law tort case that is correct as a matter of law allocatively inefficient is
similar to the second. Assume that (1) the trier-of-fact knows that a loss might have been caused
by Mother Nature alone or by a combination of Mother Nature and the choice of a particular
human being or human organization and that (2) if human choice did play a role in the relevant
loss’ generation, the choice in question was wrongful and allocatively inefficient. Assume in
addition that the trier-of-fact has imperfect information about whether human choice did play a
role in the generation of the loss in question—indeed, that the only information it has on this
issue is information about the contribution that the defendant’s activity made to the ex ante
53

For a detailed discussion of the situations of this kind in which courts have and have not adopted this type
of market-share-liability approach, see DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 430-32 (2000). See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES), Tentative Draft No. 2, §280. Market-share
liability 103-34 and Comment o. Market-Share Liability 185-90.
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probability that the loss would occur. In an otherwise-Pareto-perfect world, the allocativelyefficient way for the court to respond to this sort of situation would be to hold the possible
injurer liable and require him to pay the victim that percentage of the victim’s loss that the
possible injurer’s activity contributed to the ex ante probability of the loss’ occurring. However,
that solution is inconsistent with the binary conception of corrective-justice rights to which we
seem to be committed and which I think is consistent with if not required by liberal
commitments. Under this binary conception, the possible injurer will be liable for the whole loss
if his activity contributed more than 50% of the ex ante probability of its occurring and liable for
none of the loss if his activity contributed 50% or less than 50% to the ex ante probability of the
loss’ occurring.54

In an otherwise-Pareto-perfect world, this binary response will cause

misallocation in two ways:
(1)

by deterring possible injurers in this position from making allocatively-efficient
avoidance-moves that would reduce the contribution their activity made to the ex
ante probability of the loss’ occurring from some higher probability not above
50% to some lower probability not above 50% and

(2)

by inducing possible injurers in this position to make allocatively-inefficient
avoidance-moves that reduce their activity’s contribution to the ex ante
probability of the loss’ occurring from some probability above 50% to some
probability below 50%.

Some illustrations may be helpful. I start with the first possible type of misallocation.
Assume that (1) the loss in question is $100,000, (2) the probability that the loss would have
incurred if the possible injurer did not avoid was 40%, (3) the probability that the loss would
have occurred had the defendant shut down his operations was 30%, (4) all relevant parties are
risk-neutral, and (5) the economy is otherwise-Pareto-perfect.

In this initial situation, the

defendant will not be liable for any loss that occurred because his activity contributed
(10%/40%)=25%<50.01% of the ex ante probability of the loss’ occurring—i.e., will have to
reckon with paying no damages. Now assume that by spending $1,000 the possible injurer could
have eliminated his contribution to the ex ante probability of the loss’ occurring. Since this
avoidance-move

would

have

reduced

the

54

weighted-average-expected

loss

by

The case law and RESTATEMENT discussion of this issue is admittedly confused and confusing. See
DOBBS, op. cit. supra note 53 at 419 and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §328D.
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10%($100,000)=$10,000, it would have increased allocative efficiency by $9,000. However,
because the defendant’s failure to make this avoidance-move would not have rendered him liable
(because—even if it would have been detected—it could not have been shown to have been more
than 50% likely to have been a but-for cause of the loss), the move would have reduced his
profits by $1,000.
The following example illustrates the second misallocative possibility. Assume that (1)
the loss in question is $100,000, (2) the probability that the loss would have occurred if the
putative injurer had not avoided was 80%, (3) the probability that the loss would have occurred
had the possible injurer shut down his operation was 30% so that the possible injurer’s activity
would have contributed (50%/80%)=62.5%>50.01% of the ex ante probability of the loss’
occurring if he had not avoided, (4) all relevant parties are risk-neutral, (5) the economy is
otherwise-Pareto-perfect, and (6) the possible injurer could have made an avoidance-move that
would have cost him $60,000 and would have reduced the absolute amount by which his activity
increased the probability of the loss’ occurring from 50% to 30%—i.e., that would have reduced
the percentage-contribution his activity made to the ex ante probability of the loss’ occurring
from (50%/80%)=62.5%>50.01% to (30%/60))=50%<50.01%.

On these assumptions, the

avoidance-move in question would have increased the possible injurer’s profits by $20,000 since
it would have cost him $60,000 and eliminated his liability, which he would have valued at
80%($100,000)=$80,000 prior to his making the avoidance-move in question. Unfortunately, on
these assumptions, the avoidance-move in question would have reduced allocative efficiency by
$40,000 since its allocative (as well as its private) cost was $60,000 and its ex ante allocative
benefits were $20,000 (the product of [the 20% reduction in the probability of the loss it would
effectuate] and [the loss in question—$100,000]): the associated $60,000 inflation in the
profitability of the avoidance-move in question equals the amount by which it increased the
uncompensated loss the potential victims must reckon with bearing (from $0 of $80,000 in
weighted-average-expected losses to $60,000 of $60,000 in weighted-average-expected losses).
As I have already indicated, the court response that would prevent these two types of
misallocation by eliminating the distortion in avoidance-incentives the current binary approach
generates in these two types of situations—a rule that would hold the possible injurer liable for
that percentage of the loss that his activity contributed to the ex ante probability of its occurring
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and thereby equate the amount by which the possible injurer’s avoidance would reduce the
damages he should expect to have to pay on the weighted average with the amount by which it
would reduce the weighted-average expected loss—is incompatible with the binary conceptual
corrective-justice rights with which liberalism seems to be at least compatible.
The fifth type of information whose imperfect availability can render the resolution of a
common-law tort case that is correct as a matter of law allocatively inefficient is information that
relates to the wrongfulness of an injurer’s and/or victim’s conduct.

I will illustrate this

possibility with three increasingly-complex examples.
The first example assumes that the trier-of-fact knows that (1) the situation in question is
either an individual-care situation (one in which the most-allocatively-efficient response to the
accident-or-pollution-loss contingency in question is for either the potential victim or the
potential injurer to avoid) or a no-care situation (one in which the most-allocatively-efficient
response to the relevant contingency is for no-one to avoid) and (2) there is a 30% probability
that the potential injurer could have increased ex ante allocative efficiency while conferring a net
equivalent-dollar gain on others by avoiding while there is no chance that the victim could have
increased allocative efficiency by avoiding. In such a situation, transaction-cost considerations
aside, it would be ex ante allocatively efficient to find the potential injurer liable since doing so
would tend to induce his future counterparts to engage in allocatively-efficient avoidance when
they could do so without deterring his victim’s future counterparts from engaging in allocativelyefficient avoidance since ex hypothesis they cannot do so. However, in a common-law case of
this kind in a liberal, rights-based State, it would not be proper for the trier-of-fact to find the
injurer liable since the probability that the injurer had behaved wrongfully was not over 50%—
specifically, was only 30%. In this kind of situation, therefore, the State could not provide
potential injurers with appropriate avoidance-incentives by “legalizing” their victims’ correctivejustice rights.
The second wrongfulness-information example extends the first to a situation in which
(1) the imperfectly-informed trier-of-fact knows that the situation was either a no-care or an
individual-care situation, (2) the imperfectly-informed trier-of-fact knows that there is some
possibility that the victim might have been the most-allocatively-efficient potential avoider and
some probability that the injurer might have been the most-allocatively-efficient potential
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avoider, and (3) the relevant probabilities enable the trier-of-fact to divide the loss in a way that
guarantees that the most-allocatively-efficient avoidance-move will be made, regardless of
whether the potential injurer or the potential victim is the party in a position to make it. Assume,
in particular, that the trier-of-fact knows that (1) the loss is $100,000, (2) the avoidance-moves
the injurer and victim in question could have made would not have affected the sum of tort-lossrelated risk costs that would be generated, (3) the economy is otherwise-Pareto-perfect, (4) if the
potential injurer can prevent the $100,000 loss allocatively efficiently, he can do so for less than
$80,000, and (5) if the potential victim can prevent the $100,000 loss allocative efficiently, he
can do so for less than $15,000. In this instance, any division of the loss between the potential
injurer and potential victim that future counterparts of these parties can anticipate between
($80,000 to the injurer and $20,000 to the victim) and ($85,000 to the injurer and $15,000 to the
victim) will insure that allocatively-efficient avoidance-decisions will be made. By way of
contrast, a loss-division of $100,000 to the injurer and $0 to the victim—the division that a
common-law judge will be obligated to order if the trier-of-fact concludes that the probability
that the injurer was negligent was higher than 50% and that the probability that the victim was
contributorily negligent was not higher than 50%—will fail to induce the victim to avoid when
he is the potential most-allocatively-efficient avoider, and a loss-division of $100,000 to the
victim and $0 to the injurer—the division that a common-law judge will be obligated to order if
the trier-of-fact concludes that the probability that the injurer was negligent was not higher than
50%—will fail to induce the injurer to avoid when he is the potential most-allocatively-efficient
avoider.
The third wrongfulness-information example generalizes the second still further to
situations in which no loss-diversion could guarantee allocative efficiency in an otherwisePareto-perfect world because (if we assume for simplicity that the most allocatively-efficient
avoidance-moves that might have been available respectively to the potential injurer and to the
potential victims would have generated the same reduction in weighted-average-expected
accident-or-pollution losses) the sum of (1) the highest cost that the potential injurer would have
had to incur to generate that weighted-average-expected loss-reduction in the most-allocativelyefficient way it could manage and (2) the highest cost that the potential victims would have had
to incur to generate that weighted-average-expected loss-reduction in the most-allocatively-
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efficient way it could manage was not lower than (3) the weighted-average-expected lossreduction either’s most-allocatively-efficient avoidance-move would generate. If in such a case I
assume optimistically but in no way critically (1) that the judge has information about the
probability that each party will be able to generate a $100,000 reduction in weighted-averageexpected losses by incurring avoidance-costs within each $1,000 internal between $0-$1,000 and
$99,000-$100,000 and (for convenience) (2) that any actor who will be able to avoid at a cost
within a given $1,000 interval will be able to do so at the $500 mid-point of that interval, the
judge could determine the ex ante most-allocatively-efficient loss-division by starting with a
loss-division of $100,000 to the victim and $0 to the injurer and asking whether ex ante
weighted-average-expected allocative efficiency would be increased or decreased (a) by a shift
from a $100,000/$0 to $99,000/$1,000 victim/injurer loss-division, (b) by a shift in the lossdivision from a $99,000/$1,000 victim/injurer loss-division to a $98,000/$2,000 victim/injurer
loss-division and so on and so forth. If for illustration we assume that there is a one-in-a-million
chance—a (.0001)% probability—that the potential victim will be able to increase ex ante
allocative efficiency by $99,500 by reducing the weighted-average-expected loss by $100,000 at
an avoidance-cost of $500 and a one-in-a-hundred chance—a 1% probability—that the potential
injurer will be able to increase ex ante allocative efficiency by $500 by reducing the weightedaverage-expected loss by $100,000 by incurring $99,500 in avoidance-costs, the net allocativeefficiency effect of shifting from a $100,000/$0 victim/injurer loss-division to a $99,000/$1,000
victim/injurer loss-division will be a gain of ([1%][$500]-[.0001%][$99,500]=$5-$.995=$4.005).
The judge would then repeat this calculation for each additional shift about which he had
information and pick the loss-division that involved the total shift associated with the highest net
gain. Although the loss-division that this approach reveals to be ex ante most-allocativelyefficient might be the $100,000/$0 or $0/$100,000 victim/injurer loss-division that corrective
justice would warrant in this kind of case, I suspect that this will be true only rarely.
*

*

*

We have just seen that, for twelve sorts of reasons, the common-law decision that would
be ex ante most-allocatively-efficient for a judge or jury to make may not be consistent with our
corrective-justice commitments. In my judgment, it is not morally legitimate for judges in
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rights-based societies to decide common-law tort cases by making allocatively-efficient rulings
that are not required by the relevant society’s corrective-justice commitments.
3.

The Various Non-Common-Law Components of the Positive Tort Law of a Liberal,
Rights-Based State: Their Moral Status (Legitimacy) and Likely Generic Desirability
Even liberal, rights-based societies that have a common law of torts will or may also have

other types of tort-related law: (A) constitutional tort law, (B) legislatively-promulgated tort law
that is constitutional, (C) (non-corrective-justice-based) judicially-created tort law promulgated
by judges to whom legislative power has not been delegated by the legislature, (D)
administrative-agency-created tort law promulgated by agency officials who have not been
authorized to legislate by the legislature, and (E) (non-corrective-justice-based) new tort law
promulgated by judges or administrative-agency officials who have been authorized by the
legislature to create the law they promulgated. Part 3 (1) analyzes the moral status (legitimacy)
of all those possible components of the tort law of a liberal, rights-based society—i.e., analyzes
the relationship between such law and the society’s liberal, moral-rights commitments, (2)
discusses the substance of the corrective-justice-securing and non-corrective-justice-securing
tort-related law a liberal, rights-based society’s legislature might be obligated to enact or might
properly enact, and (3) comments on the generic desirability, rights-considerations aside, of
legislatures’ authorizing judges and administrative-officials to promulgate tort legislation that
will have only prospective application.
A.

Constitutional Tort Law
In my judgment, the governments of rights-based States are obligated to make their best

efforts to maximize the rights-related interests of those for whom they are responsible. This
premise implies that the governments of a liberal, rights-based State are obligated not only to
avoid committing torts against the moral-rights holders for whom they are responsible but also to
make their best efforts (1) to minimize the extent to which their society’s members and
participants commit torts against each other and (2) to maximize the extent to which victims of
tortious wrongdoing can obtain redress from those who have violated their tort rights (or, when
these two goals cannot be achieved simultaneously, to minimize some function that equals the
sum of the rights-related-interest “harm” done by tortious wrongdoing and the rights-relatedArticles/09_27_2004_Liberalism_and_Tort_Law
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interest “harm” done when tort victims do not have an appropriate opportunity to secure redress
from their wrongful injurers).
Before proceeding, I should point out two important implications of my description of the
basic obligations of the governments of any rights-based society. The first is that, in my
admittedly-contestable and certainly-contested judgment, all the concrete moral and
constitutional rights of the members of and participants in a rights-based society are prima facie
rights in that they need not be protected if the government could protect them only by sacrificing
the rights-related interests of relevant rights-holders on balance.55 Of course, in a society as
wealthy as the contemporary United States, I doubt that this qualification has much practical
significance—e.g., I doubt that the government will be able to justicize (render just) its failure to
secure a relevant concrete tort-related right by arguing that the right’s sacrifice was necessary to
enable it to provide additional resources to relevant moral-rights bearers who needed them to be
in a position to take their lives morally seriously (would critically affect the government’s ability
to make such transfers to these individuals by saving allocative transaction costs or increasing
allocative efficiency in other ways). The second implication of my description of the basic
obligation of a rights-based State’s governments is that the governments of any rights-based
State cannot justicize its failure to protect some individual’s tort-related moral right when this
choice will not secure relevant rights-related interests on balance by demonstrating that the
choice in question would further the achievement of various perfectly-legitimate non-rightsrelated moral goals.
In short, in my judgment, the members of and participants in a liberal, rights-based
society have a constitutional right that their governments make their best efforts to secure their
tort-related rights in all ways that will do so without sacrificing relevant rights-related interests
on balance.56 As I have already indicated, one way in which such governments can fulfill this
55

For my justification for this position and my response to various well-know arguments against it made by
highly-respected philosophers, see Richard S. Markovits, Precommitment Analysis and Societal Moral Identity, 81
TEX. L. REV. 877, 915-21 (2003).
56
In the United States, I would deem this right to be one of the unenumerated rights to which the Eighth
Amendment refers and one of the privileges or immunities to which the Fourteenth Amendment refers. Others
might argue that it has a textual basis in the “due process” clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and is
manifest in the Sixth Amendment’s right to trail by jury. For an excellent, thorough account of the history of the
idea in American thought that our governments are morally and constitutionally obligated to protect the moral rights
that our society’s members and participants have against each other, see John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional
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obligation is to pass legislation creating common-law courts authorized to secure the tort-related
corrective-justice rights of the society’s members and participants and structuring the associated
legal procedures in ways that both (1) give potential plaintiffs and potential defendants
appropriate access to justice and (2) make it appropriately likely that correct legal conclusions
will be reached. Obviously, however, the governments of a liberal, rights-based State could also
fulfill this obligation by enacting a tort statute that “legalized” its members’ and participants’
tort-related corrective-justice rights and provided them with appropriate opportunities to secure
their legal rights.57 In addition, I suspect that the governments of a liberal, rights-based State
may be constitutionally obligated to do more than merely give tort victims who have correctivejustice rights an appropriate opportunity to obtain redress by securing compensation from
injurers whom they can prove more probably than not violated their rights by making choices
that were the but-for cause of their loss. For example, I think that the governments of a liberal,
Status of Tort Law: Blackstone, Due Process, and the Place in Liberal Political Theory of a Law for the Redress of
Wrongs (unpublished manuscript, 2005).
57
Although this conclusion does imply that legislation that reduces the ability of tort plaintiffs to vindicate
their rights by barring recovery for pain and suffering, capping overall damage-awards, creating stricter time-limits
for the filing of tort suits, capping the contingency fees that tort-plaintiff lawyers can charge, etc., may be
unconstitutional, it does not imply that such legislation is unconstitutional: tort defendants have moral rights as well,
and some of these reforms might be morally-acceptable responses to the tendency of triers-of-fact to make errors of
various kinds that unjustly favor tort-plaintiffs. The text’s conclusion also has possible implications for the
constitutionality of the decision of the legislatures of a liberal, rights-based society to allow tort-liability insurance
and to permit tort-related-rights violators to avoid compensating their victims by going bankrupt: This, if a liberal,
rights-based society’s members and participants have a rights-related interest in their wrongful injurers’
compensating them and realizing no profits from their wrongdoing, tort-liability insurance would be justicizable
only if it served the relevant victims’ tort-related interests on balance. Tort-liability insurance also affects potential
victims’ tort-related rights-related interests by increasing the proportion of their losses they will be able to recover
and having an uncertain effect on the amount of tortious wrongdoing that takes place in the society in question.
Although it is generally assumed that tort-liability insurance encourages tortious wrongdoing by reducing the private
cost to potential avoiders of rejecting avoidance-moves whose rejection will render them liable, this effect (1) is
reduced by deductibles and the dependence of future premiums on past pay-outs made on behalf of the insured and
(2) may be more or less offset by such insurance’s possible tendency to prevent potential tortfeasors from
committing torts (A) by providing them with insurance-premium data that sheds light on the tort losses for which
they will be held liable if they do not change their ways (by overcoming any tendency they have to commit torts
because they underestimate this figure), (B) by providing insurance companies with an incentive to condition their
coverage on the insured’s making certain safety-arrangements, and (C) by providing insurance companies with an
incentive to do research designed to discover avoidance-moves that liberalism would require to be made once they
were known. Although I have not given this issue the attention it deserves, my inclination is to conclude that it
would not be permissible for a liberal, rights-based State to pass a law allowing a tortfeasor to escape liability to his
victim by going bankrupt unless it simultaneously agreed to compensate the victim for his loss or at least for that
part of his loss that the tortfeasor could be induced to pay. If the tortfeasor could be induced to pay some part of the
loss only through methods that violated his rights, one might still say that the State should bear the loss the victim
was unable to recover because the State refused to violate the tortfeasor’s rights. Obviously, I recognize that this
issue is difficult and that I have said little to illuminate it.
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rights-based State have a constitutional obligation to pass legislation that would grant two classes
of victims a right to obtain compensation from wrongdoers against whom they cannot establish a
corrective-justice claim:
(1)

the class of individual victims whose attempts to secure compensation on a
corrective-justice basis would be thwarted by their inability to identify their actual
injurer—i.e., to identify the particular member of a set of wrongdoers whose
wrongful choices inflicted the kind of recoverable loss the individual victim
suffered on some moral-rights holders who more probably than not had harmed
him—and

(2)

the class of individual victims who have suffered losses that were simultaneously
and independently caused by the satisfaction of two or more sets of sufficient
conditions at least one of which had a member that was a wrongful choice by a
moral agent.58

More particularly, I think that the governments of a liberal, rights-based State are obligated to
pass legislation that would entitle any victim in the first class to recover from each of his
possible injurers a percentage of his loss equal to the probability that the injurer in question
caused his loss. Relatedly, I think that the governments of a liberal, rights-based State are
obligated to pass legislation that would entitle any victim in this class to collect from the
wrongful choosers in question a total sum equal to his total loss.

I also think that the

governments of a liberal, rights-based State are obligated to pass legislation requiring the
wrongful putative injurers in such cases who have not individually paid each such victim
damages equal to his full loss to pay civil fines equal to the difference between the loss the
victim sustained and the payment being made.59 Such legislation would have the additional
advantage of preventing the loss from being distributed unfairly among the putative injurers and
of deterring whipsawing tactics that may be allocatively-transaction-costly and may enable
victims to secure payments to which they are not morally entitled.

58

Admittedly, no-one has a right to be compensated by wrongdoers whose wrongful choices turn out not to
“cause” (on any construction of “cause”) harm (other than the “abstract” harm that wrongful choices generate by
showing disrespect for all their potential victims). However, it does not seem to me that someone whose wrongful
choice was a necessary element of a set of sufficient conditions for a loss’ occurring all of whose members were
fulfilled is entitled to his moral luck—i.e., to benefit from the fortuity that the loss with his choice was associated
would have occurred had he not made a wrongful choice that guaranteed its occurrence.
59
Admittedly, it might be appropriate to adjust the civil fines in question to reflect the fact that the relevant
putative injurer’s avoidance-incentives were distorted by other Pareto imperfections.
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The governments of liberal, rights-based States are also morally obligated to prevent
tortious wrongdoing by socializing its members and participants to treat each other with
appropriate, equal respect and concern and providing them with the intellectual skills needed to
make non-tortious choices.
Finally, the governments of liberal, rights-based States may also be morally and hence
constitutionally obligated to pass legislation (1) to secure allocatively-efficient and/or life-ofmoral-integrity-opportunity-enhancing outcomes in the type of step-function loss cases
previously analyzed and (2) to prevent mere-utility losses from being generated allocatively
inefficiently or life-of-moral-integrity opportunities from being lost because relevant actors are
misinformed. In particular, the governments of a liberal, rights-based society will be obligated to
pass such legislation when the preventable loss was a mere-utility loss unless its decision could
reasonably have been thought to have been rendered morally desirable by its tendency to
promote some legitimate, non-liberal distributive goal or some other type of defensible, nonliberal social goal more beneficially than it could in any other way, and the governments of a
liberal, rights-based society will be obligated to pass such legislation when the preventable loss
was opportunity-to-lead-a-life-of-moral-integrity-related unless its decision secured rightsrelated interests on balance (in comparison with the most-rights-related-interest-securing set of
policies it could have adopted).
The point of this section is that, if the legislatures of a liberal, rights-based State fail to
make their best efforts to secure the liberal, tort-related corrective-justice rights and rightsrelated interests of their society’s members and participants by passing legislation, conceivably
by authorizing administrative agencies to pass appropriate legislation, and by supervising the
way in which judges and administrative hearing officers apply the law, individual moral rightsholders whose tort-related rights have been sacrificed by these government failures will have a
moral right to receive compensation from the government—a moral right whose constitutional
counterpart would in principle be judicially enforceable, though in some instances imperfections
in the information available to courts would lead them to be underenforced.
B.

Legislatively-Promulgated Tort Law and Tort-Related Law That Is Constitutional
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Tort law is the body of law that protects interests not protected by contract law or
property law. Conventionally, tort law includes not only (1) law that gives legal effect to
victims’ tort-related corrective-justice rights but also (2) law that is designed to prevent the kinds
of concrete losses that tortious wrongdoing can generate or to grant their victims the legal right
to obtain compensation for such losses even when those losses are caused by human choices that
are not wrongful. This section is concerned not only with tort law in this broader sense but also
with what might be called “tort-related law:” (1) law that is designed to decrease the allocative
transaction cost of securing tort-related corrective-justice rights to any given extent, (2) law that
is designed to increase the accuracy of the resolution of corrective-justice-based tort suits, (3)
law such as bankruptcy law that is designed to secure a mixture of allocative-efficiency and noncorrective-justice distributive goals that cannot be fully achieved without sacrificing tort-related
interests (though the State can reduce and may be constitutionally obligated to reduce the
disservice these laws do to such interests by compensating the bankrupt’s tort victims itself), (4)
law that is designed purely to effectuate non-corrective-justice distributive norms,60 which may
or may not disserve the corrective-justice interests of victims of tortiously-wrongful conduct and
that therefore may or may not have to be combined with a State program to compensate the
corrective-justice right-holders the primary policy harmed, and (5) law that is designed to further
the parochial interests of its supporters—law that may or may not (fortuitously) be desirable
from any defensible normative perspective and that may be unconstitutional on that account,
regardless of whether it disserved any tort-related interest that is constitutionally protected. I
have included this section for two reasons: (1) to acknowledge that the body of law
conventionally called tort law and a fortiori the body of law that I am calling tort-related law
contain law that is not designed solely to secure the corrective-justice and corrective-justicerelated rights of actual and potential tort victims and (2) to set up the remaining sections of Part
3, which focus on the moral status (inter alia, the moral permissibility) and likely generic
desirability (rights-considerations aside) of tort law that is not created by common-law courts or
legislatures that are exercising their respective authorities.

60

For an explanation of why such laws may be the most desirable way to effectuate such norms, see Richard
S. Markovits, Why Kaplow and Shavell’s “Double-Distortion-Argument” Argument Is Wrong, ___ GEO. MASON L.
REV. ___ (2004).
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C.

Non-Corrective-Justice-Based Tort Law Created by Judges Whom the Legislature Has
Not Authorized to Exercise Legislative Power
Many contemporary law professors and a significant number of contemporary judges are

moral-rights skeptics—indeed, dismiss moral-rights discourse as mumbo-jumbo. Some who take
this position do believe in the coherence of legal argument—indeed, believe that legal argument
can yield unique, correct answers to all legal-rights questions, but their view of the set of legal
arguments that can produce such answers represents law as an arcane practice in which moralrights considerations play no role. However, most contemporary law professors and judges who
are moral-rights skeptics do not believe that legal argument can generate unique answers that are
right as a matter of law and maintain that judges should decide cases to promote various nonmoral-rights-related goals—i.e., should operate as social engineers. Many tort scholars and
judges belong in this latter group. Some such as Professor Fleming James and Judge Roger
Traynor recommend that judges resolve common-law tort cases in the way the would maximize
the extent to which the loss is spread.61 Others such a Professor William Prosser recommend that
judges resolve common-law tort cases in the way that will produce “the greatest happiness for
the greatest number.”62 And still others such as Professor (now Judge) Richard Posner argue that
such cases should be decided in the way that maximizes economic efficiency.63
I began this section with the preceding paragraph to forestall the reaction that no-one
would think that it was morally permissible or desirable for judges to usurp legislative power by
creating truly-new law (which did not secure the plaintiff’s right to corrective justice) that would
promote some arguably-desirable social goal. If my non-systematic experience is a reliable
guide, this reaction is mistaken—many contemporary law professors think that judges should act
as social engineers.
In my view, in any type of rights-based State, it would be morally impermissible for
judges who have not been authorized to legislate by the legislature or the People to promulgate
61

For an account of James’ position, see John C.P. Goldberg, Comment: Misconduct, Misfortune and Just
Compensation: Weinstein on Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2045-50 (1998). For Traynor’s position, see Roger J.
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 366, 369, 37576 (1965). These cites are taken from Goldberg, op. cit. supra note 56 at n. 382.
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WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §3 at 15, 17 (1st ed. 1941).
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Richard A. Posner, Same Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 287 (1979).
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new law to achieve the social good even if they applied the new law they promulgate only
prospectively. Moreover this conclusion would hold a fortiori for such judges’ usurping the
power to create such truly-new law and then applying it retrospectively as well as prospectively.
Regardless of the moral norm from which a given society derives its moral-rights
conclusions, usurpations of political power violate the moral rights of the individuals who have
the right to exercise or delegate that power.

In a liberal, rights-based society (which is

committed to treating all its members with appropriate, equal respect and concern), the
empowered group consists of all society-members who have the capacity to make the relevant
choices in a minimally competent fashion. This conclusion is a corollary of the basic duty such a
society is committed to fulfilling since that duty requires that each member of such a society
have an equal, appropriate opportunity to be the author of the laws that will govern him (an
admittedly-hard-to-operationalize concept that I believe is clearly violated by usurpations of
political power).64
Moreover, if judges apply retrospectively any truly-new law they create, their decision to
do so will fail to show the respect that is owed the loser of the case in question by subjecting him
to ex post facto legislation: even if such judicially-created legislation is not designed to punish
personal or political enemies or to deter personal or political opposition, it disrespects its victims
by failing to give them fair notice of the law they will be sanctioned for violating.
I should add that, for at least three reasons, even if judicial usurpation of socialengineering power were morally permissible in a liberal, rights-based State (i.e., did not violate
the usurping judges’ obligations and the rights of “the People”), it would probably be generically
a bad idea. First, the training and professional experience of judges, the staffs that are available
to them, and the decisionmaking procedures they are constrained to use make it less likely that
they will perform social-engineering functions better than will legislatures or administrative
64

Admittedly, one might argue that, given the reality that our actual political system falls far short of
instantiating this liberal political-opportunity norm, judicial usurpation of political power might equalize the
opportunity of society-members to influence the laws that will govern them because the individuals who have a
higher-than-average ability to influence judicial social engineering have a lower-than-average ability to influence
legislative and executive-branch social engineering. I question the accuracy of this empirical premise, am confident
that its accuracy would decline if judges engaged more in social engineering, and have doubts about the legitimacy
of taking this type of second-best approach to rights-violations: am inclined to think that—when political
arrangements violate participation rights and increase on this account the probability that outcome-rights will be
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agencies. Although many of the courses that students take in law school expose them to moralrights and other sorts of normative analyses even when taught by professors who claim that such
analyses have no role to play or do not play an important role in legal argument and lawyers in
their professional practices often make arguments that are either explicitly normative or are
based on moral understandings (e.g., arguments about whether historical argument should be
broad-gauged or narrow-gauged), law schools do not train people to be social engineers and (I
suspect) would be unlikely to do so as well as the public-policy schools, economics departments,
and sociology departments that are increasingly likely to have trained administrative-agency
personnel even if judges engaged in a lot more social engineering than they do at present.
Although the preceding comparative disadvantage of judges might be offset in the short run by
the lower likelihood that they would be “politically corrupt” in both a narrow and broad sense of
that expression, I expect that any corruption advantage would diminish through time if judges
increasingly performed a social-engineering role since this change in role would lead to changes
in the kind of people who compete for judgeships and the processes through which and criteria
by which judges are selected. Second, at least if one believes that there are internally-right
answers to some tort-law questions and that cases in which such answers exist should be
controlled by them, there is a risk that judges who choose to legislate in cases in which the only
answer that is right as a matter of law is the rule that a plaintiff loses if he cannot establish more
than a 50% probability that he is legally entitled to a verdict in his favor may choose to ignore
the answer that is correct as a matter of law in cases in which the plaintiff or defendant can
establish his legal right when the judge considers that internally-right answer to the legal-rights
question to be wrong as a matter of policy. Third, if one thinks that rights-based societies of
moral integrity are more morally desirable than goal-based societies of moral integrity, judicial
usurpations of legislative power will also tent to be generally undesirable to the extent that they
undermine the public’s consciousness of the distinction between the right and the good and
derivatively its rights-commitedness.
D.

Tort Law Created by Administrative-Agency Officials Who Have Not Been Authorized
by a Legislature or the People to Perform This Function

violated as well—rights-based societies must respond by eliminating “imperfections” rather than introducing
offsetting imperfections.
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I want to make five points about such law.

First, in a rights-based society,

administrative-agency usurpation of legislative power is equally-rights-violate as judicial
usurpation of legislative power. Second, if administrative “regulations” truly do create new law,
the retrospective application of such new law will be equally-rights-violative as the retrospective
application of judicially-created new law. Third, the formal training and professional experience
of administrative-agency officials, their ability to specialize, the staff that is available to them,
and the procedures that they can use to create new law give them a comparative advantage over
judges and possibly over legislatures at engaging in social engineering.

Fourth, the

specialization of administrative agencies may make them more vulnerable to capture than either
legislatures or courts of general jurisdiction. And fifth, the concern that judges who are also
supposed to adjudicate cases that raise issues for which there are internally-right answers will be
less likely to perform this function properly if they act as social engineers in other situations will
be equally salient in the administrative-agency context only if the agency officials who engage in
social engineering are administrative hearing officers—i.e., only if within the agency the
legislative and adjudicatory roles are not assigned to different personnel and institutions.
E.

Non-Corrective-Justice-Based Tort Law Created by Judges or Administrative-Agency
Officials to Whom the Legislature Has Delegated Such Power
Legislative redelegations of legislative power to judges or administrative-agency officials

raise only one issue not already considered: the moral permissibility and related constitutionality
of the redelegation itself in a rights-based society. Regardless of whether it would be wise for
them to do so, I suspect that it would not be morally impermissible for the members of a liberal,
rights-based society to authorize state officials who also function as judges or administrative
interpreters and appliers of legislation to promulgate new law that would apply exclusively
prospectively.

However, although the American public appears to have acquiesced to its

legislatures’ redelegating their legislative power to administrative agencies, I do find such
redelegations morally problematic in rights-based societies if they are not explicitly authorized
by the People regardless of whether the delegation is to an administrative-agency official or a
judge and doubt that such redelegations can be legitimated ex post by considered social
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acceptance even if that acceptance takes the form of an explicit vote on the redelegation in
question.
CONCLUSION
Virtually all academic analyses of the relationship between “morality” and the content of
American tort law take one of four tacks that I find unsatisfactory. Some such analyses claim
that moral argument of any type is irrelevant to the determination of the answer to any tort
question that is correct or a matter of law. I find this approach unsatisfactory because it is
inconsistent with the combination of the fact that the United States is a rights-based State of
moral integrity and the axiom that, to be morally legitimate, both legal argument in a given
society and the law of that society must be consistent with the society’s moral commitments.
Other analyses claim that moral argument is relevant to the determination of the internally-right
answer to any tort-law question only if the relevant moral principle is explicitly approved in the
case-law or cited by some applicable statute (or perhaps provides the best account of the
conclusions reached in the relevant cases or explicitly mandated by the relevant statute). I find
this approach unsatisfactory not only because—since Lochner65—American judges have
hesitated to include reference to moral principles in their opinions but, more fundamentally,
because it assumes that legal practice is self-legitimating (because it ignores the fact that even a
consistent legal practice can be morally illegitimate and legally invalid if it is inconsistent with
the moral commitments of the society in question [because it ignores the fact that, although a
society’s legal discourse, conduct, and perceptions from part of the data-base from which one
must determine its moral type, moral character, and specific moral commitments, such legal data
form only a small part of the relevant data-base, which primarily consists of data on the society’s
members’ prescriptive-moral discourse, conduct, and perceptions outside of legal fora]). Two
other sets of tort-law scholars contend that moral argument is relevant to the determination of the
answer to a tort-law question that is correct as a matter of law even when the moral argument in
question has never been used by a judge in a tort-law case or referenced by a statute—indeed,
claim that moral argument is not only relevant to the determination of the internally-right answer
to tort-law questions but determines the internally-right answer to all or at least some such
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questions. One set of such scholars think that the type of moral argument that plays this
determinative role is purely-conceptual, so-called foundationalist argument from which one can
derive objectively-true, universally-applicable norms of justice that determine the right answer to
all tort-law questions. I reject this approach partly because I have never been convinced by any
such foundationalist argument and partly because much statutory tort law is not designed to
effectuate justice—is designed not to secure the corrective-justice interests of relevant moralrights holders but to achieve various defensible social goals or the parochial interests of its
supporters. The other set of such scholars think that the type of moral argument that controls the
internally-right answer to tort-law questions or the answer that should be given to such questions
(1) given that there never is an internally-right answer to any question of law or (2) when there is
no internally-right answer to a particular question of tort law is an argument that derives it
conclusion from a moral norm whose instantiation the author favors but whose objective moral
superiority or optimality (he admits) cannot be established. I reject this approach for three
reasons: (1) because I believe that there are internal-to-law correct answers to all tort-law
questions in the United States, (2) because I believe that the response that is the internally-right
response to a tort-law claim in the United States that is based on the plaintiff’s corrective-justice
and corrective-justice-related rights is the response that is required by the American commitment
to protecting liberal moral rights—a commitment that must be inferred from a philosophicallyinformed empirical analysis of our society’s members’ and governments’ prescriptive-moral
discourse, conduct, and perceptions and that may require legal outcomes that are inconsistent
with those favored by the relevant scholar’s preferred personal value, and (3) because I believe
that the response that is the internally-right response to a tort-law claim in the United States that
is based on a statute that does not violate any affected party’s moral rights and is designed to
secure some defensible social goal or the parochial interests of its supporters is (roughly
speaking) the response that will most further that social goal or those interests, which may also
not be the response favored by the relevant scholar’s preferred personal value.
This Article proceeds from different conclusions about the relevance of moral argument
to the determination of the internal-to-law correct answer to tort-law questions in different
societies. It begins by distinguishing between two types of prescriptive-moral argument—moral65

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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rights arguments about the just (which derive their conclusions from moral norms I call “moral
principles”) and moral-ought arguments about the good (which derive their conclusions from
moral norms I call “personal ultimate values”). It then argues that, although some societies do
not draw a strong distinction between these two types of argument, other societies (so-called
rights-based societies) do. After that, it develops a protocol for determining whether a society is
a rights-based society or a goal-based society and another protocol for identifying the moral
norm that any society of either type is committed to instantiating. Next, it asserts that the United
States is a liberal, rights-based society of moral integrity and delineates (1) the basic obligation
of such a society’s members, participants, and governments and (2) the more concrete tortrelated corollaries of that basic obligation. In the course of executing these last analyses, the
Article explains (1) why the common law of torts of any liberal, rights-based society that has
common law will be exclusively concerned with protecting the liberal tort-related correctivejustice and corrective-justice-related rights of its members and participants, (2) why a liberal,
rights-based society that does not fully secure its members’ and participants’ tort-related rights
through the common law is constitutionally obligated to do so statutorily, (3) why a liberal,
rights-based State’s corrective-justice-securing tort law may not be allocatively efficient, (4) why
a liberal, rights-based State may be morally and constitutionally obligated to protect its members
and participants from losses that they cannot recover in contract law or property law when they
also cannot establish or do not have a corrective-justice tort claim for compensation, (5) that a
liberal, rights-based State may legitimately respond to loss-contingencies in ways designed to
achieve various non-corrective-justice goals so long as their efforts to do so do not sacrifice
rights-related interest on balance, (6) that decisions by judges in rights-based States to create
non-corrective-justice-securing tort law are morally impermissible and hence unconstitutional
absent authorization from the legislation or the People, morally impermissible and hence
unconstitutional even if authorized if the new law is to be applied retrospectively, and
generically of dubious desirability, moral rights and constitutional considerations aside, (7) that
decisions by administrative-agency officials to create tort law are morally impermissible and
hence unconstitutional if not authorized by the legislature or the People, and (8) that legislative
decisions to redelegate the legislative power given them by the People to judges or
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administrative-agency officials are morally and hence constitutionally dubious absent an explicit
ex ante vote of the People authorizing such redelegations.
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